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[DFAN14A] Barnwell Industries, Inc. SEC Filing

Filing Impact
(Low)
Filing Sentiment
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Form Type
DFAN14A
Rhea-AI Filing Summary

A 30% shareholder alleges that Barnwell Industries' board has spent nearly all of the company's roughly $2 million cash over six months to resist the shareholder's efforts to nominate directors, accelerating cash losses and destroying shareholder value. The filing accuses the board of selling a Texas investment at an approximately $3 million loss to raise cash, amending promissory notes tied to a water-sale payment and delaying collections, and pursuing defensive measures—including a second poison pill and legal challenges—that the shareholder says entrench management rather than protect the business.

The shareholder states willingness to discuss settlements and potential financings but says the board refused constructive solutions and blocked qualified director candidates, while the company has publicly noted it is "investigating potential sources of funding, including debt financing, issuance of stock." The filing also alleges the company’s pension plan purchased about 520,000 shares of BRN stock.

Un azionista con il 30% del capitale sostiene che il consiglio di amministrazione di Barnwell Industries abbia speso quasi tutti i circa 2 milioni di dollari di liquidità dell’azienda in sei mesi per opporsi ai suoi tentativi di nominare amministratori, accelerando le perdite di cassa e distruggendo valore per gli azionisti. Il deposito accusa il consiglio di aver venduto un investimento in Texas con una perdita di circa 3 milioni di dollari per raccogliere fondi, di aver modificato cambiali legate a un pagamento per la vendita di acqua ritardandone gli incassi e di aver adottato contromisure difensive — incluso un secondo poison pill e azioni legali — che, secondo l’azionista, rafforzano la posizione del management invece di tutelare l’azienda.

L’azionista dichiara di essere disposto a discutere accordi e possibili finanziamenti, ma afferma che il consiglio ha rifiutato soluzioni costruttive e bloccato candidati direttori qualificati, mentre la società ha reso noto di "stare indagando potenziali fonti di finanziamento, incluso finanziamento tramite debito e emissione di azioni." Nel deposito si sostiene inoltre che il piano pensionistico della società avrebbe acquistato circa 520.000 azioni di BRN.

Un accionista con el 30% alega que la junta de Barnwell Industries ha gastado casi todo el efectivo de la compañía, aproximadamente 2 millones de dólares, en seis meses para resistir sus intentos de nominar directores, acelerando las pérdidas de efectivo y destruyendo valor para los accionistas. La presentación acusa a la junta de vender una inversión en Texas con una pérdida aproximada de 3 millones de dólares para obtener liquidez, de enmendar pagarés vinculados a un pago por venta de agua y retrasar su cobro, y de adoptar medidas defensivas —incluida una segunda "poison pill" y acciones legales— que, según el accionista, afianzan a la dirección en lugar de proteger el negocio.

El accionista afirma estar dispuesto a negociar acuerdos y posibles financiamientos, pero dice que la junta rechazó soluciones constructivas y bloqueó a candidatos directivos calificados, mientras la compañía ha señalado públicamente que está "investigando fuentes potenciales de financiación, incluyendo financiación con deuda y emisión de acciones." La presentación también alega que el plan de pensiones de la compañía compró alrededor de 520.000 acciones de BRN.

30%의 지분을 가진 주주가 반웰 인더스트리즈(Barnwell Industries) 이사회가 이사 지명 시도를 저지하기 위해 지난 6개월 동안 회사의 약 200만 달러 현금을 거의 전부 사용해 현금 손실을 가속화하고 주주 가치를 훼손했다고 주장합니다. 제출 문서는 이사회가 현금을 마련하기 위해 텍사스 투자 자산을 약 300만 달러 손실로 매각했고, 물 판매 대금과 연계된 약속어음들을 수정해 회수 시기를 늦췄으며, 두 번째 포이즌 필(poison pill)과 소송 등 경영진을 보호하는 방어 조치를 취했다고 비난합니다. 주주는 이 같은 조치들이 사업 보호가 아니라 경영진의 지위 공고화에 불과하다고 말합니다.

주주는 합의 및 잠재적 자금 조달 논의에 응할 의사가 있다고 밝혔지만, 이사회가 건설적 해결책을 거부하고 자격 있는 이사 후보자들을 차단했다고 주장합니다. 회사는 공개적으로 "부채 조달, 주식 발행 등 잠재적 자금원 조사를 진행 중"이라고 밝혔습니다. 제출 문서에는 회사의 연금 계획이 약 520,000주의 BRN 주식을 매입했다는 주장도 포함되어 있습니다.

Un actionnaire détenant 30 % des parts affirme que le conseil d'administration de Barnwell Industries a dépensé, en six mois, presque la totalité des quelque 2 millions de dollars de trésorerie de la société pour s'opposer à ses tentatives de nomination de administrateurs, accélérant ainsi les pertes de trésorerie et détruisant la valeur pour les actionnaires. Le dossier accuse le conseil d'avoir vendu un investissement au Texas en réalisant une perte d'environ 3 millions de dollars pour lever des liquidités, d'avoir modifié des billets à ordre liés à un paiement lié à la vente d'eau en retardant les encaissements, et d'avoir pris des mesures défensives — y compris un second poison pill et des actions judiciaires — qui, selon l'actionnaire, consolident la position de la direction plutôt que de protéger l'entreprise.

L'actionnaire déclare être disposé à discuter de règlements et de financements potentiels, mais affirme que le conseil a refusé des solutions constructives et bloqué des candidats administrateurs qualifiés, tandis que la société a publiquement indiqué qu'elle "enquêtait sur des sources potentielles de financement, y compris un financement par emprunt et l'émission d'actions." Le dossier allègue également que le régime de retraite de la société a acheté environ 520 000 actions de BRN.

Ein 30%-Aktionär behauptet, der Vorstand von Barnwell Industries habe in sechs Monaten fast das gesamte Bargeld des Unternehmens von rund 2 Millionen Dollar ausgegeben, um die Versuche des Aktionärs, Direktoren zu nominieren, abzuwehren, wodurch der Barverlust beschleunigt und der Aktionärswert zerstört worden sei. Die Einreichung wirft dem Vorstand vor, eine Investition in Texas mit einem Verlust von etwa 3 Millionen Dollar verkauft zu haben, um Liquidität zu beschaffen, Wechsel (Promissory Notes) im Zusammenhang mit einer Wasserverkaufszahlung geändert und Einzüge verzögert sowie Abwehrmaßnahmen – darunter eine zweite Poison Pill und rechtliche Schritte – ergriffen zu haben, die laut Aktionär das Management verfestigten, anstatt das Geschäft zu schützen.

Der Aktionär gibt an, zu Vergleichen und möglichen Finanzierungen bereit zu sein, sagt aber, der Vorstand habe konstruktive Lösungen abgelehnt und qualifizierte Direktorenkandidaten blockiert, während das Unternehmen öffentlich erklärt habe, es "prüfe potenzielle Finanzierungsquellen, einschließlich Fremdkapitalfinanzierung und Aktienemission." Die Einreichung behauptet außerdem, der Pensionsplan des Unternehmens habe etwa 520.000 Aktien von BRN gekauft.

Positive
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Insights

TL;DR: Significant governance conflict with material cash burn and defensive actions that may entrench the board and harm shareholder value.

The filing outlines classic takeover-defense behavior: poison-pill adoption, repeated legal challenges to nominations, and adjournment tactics that limit competitive director elections. These actions, combined with alleged depletion of cash reserves and a large realized loss on an asset sale, are materially relevant to shareholders because they affect liquidity, capital structure options, and control of the board. The claim that the board refused settlement offers that could include shareholder financing raises questions about fiduciary duty and whether directors prioritized incumbency over value maximization. Documentation on amounts, timing, and board deliberations would be needed to assess breaches or remedy options.

TL;DR: Cash burn and a $3M realized loss materially weaken near-term liquidity and raise financing risk for a small-cap company.

The shareholder reports near-total use of about $2 million in cash over six months and a roughly $3 million loss on a December 2022 Texas investment, implying severe negative cash flow pressure for a company of Barnwell’s scale. Such outflows constrain operating flexibility and make dilutive financing or costly debt more likely. The company’s public statement about exploring funding sources corroborates liquidity concern. If accurate, these items are likely to increase financing costs and heighten default or restructuring risk absent immediate corrective measures.

Un azionista con il 30% del capitale sostiene che il consiglio di amministrazione di Barnwell Industries abbia speso quasi tutti i circa 2 milioni di dollari di liquidità dell’azienda in sei mesi per opporsi ai suoi tentativi di nominare amministratori, accelerando le perdite di cassa e distruggendo valore per gli azionisti. Il deposito accusa il consiglio di aver venduto un investimento in Texas con una perdita di circa 3 milioni di dollari per raccogliere fondi, di aver modificato cambiali legate a un pagamento per la vendita di acqua ritardandone gli incassi e di aver adottato contromisure difensive — incluso un secondo poison pill e azioni legali — che, secondo l’azionista, rafforzano la posizione del management invece di tutelare l’azienda.

L’azionista dichiara di essere disposto a discutere accordi e possibili finanziamenti, ma afferma che il consiglio ha rifiutato soluzioni costruttive e bloccato candidati direttori qualificati, mentre la società ha reso noto di "stare indagando potenziali fonti di finanziamento, incluso finanziamento tramite debito e emissione di azioni." Nel deposito si sostiene inoltre che il piano pensionistico della società avrebbe acquistato circa 520.000 azioni di BRN.

Un accionista con el 30% alega que la junta de Barnwell Industries ha gastado casi todo el efectivo de la compañía, aproximadamente 2 millones de dólares, en seis meses para resistir sus intentos de nominar directores, acelerando las pérdidas de efectivo y destruyendo valor para los accionistas. La presentación acusa a la junta de vender una inversión en Texas con una pérdida aproximada de 3 millones de dólares para obtener liquidez, de enmendar pagarés vinculados a un pago por venta de agua y retrasar su cobro, y de adoptar medidas defensivas —incluida una segunda "poison pill" y acciones legales— que, según el accionista, afianzan a la dirección en lugar de proteger el negocio.

El accionista afirma estar dispuesto a negociar acuerdos y posibles financiamientos, pero dice que la junta rechazó soluciones constructivas y bloqueó a candidatos directivos calificados, mientras la compañía ha señalado públicamente que está "investigando fuentes potenciales de financiación, incluyendo financiación con deuda y emisión de acciones." La presentación también alega que el plan de pensiones de la compañía compró alrededor de 520.000 acciones de BRN.

30%의 지분을 가진 주주가 반웰 인더스트리즈(Barnwell Industries) 이사회가 이사 지명 시도를 저지하기 위해 지난 6개월 동안 회사의 약 200만 달러 현금을 거의 전부 사용해 현금 손실을 가속화하고 주주 가치를 훼손했다고 주장합니다. 제출 문서는 이사회가 현금을 마련하기 위해 텍사스 투자 자산을 약 300만 달러 손실로 매각했고, 물 판매 대금과 연계된 약속어음들을 수정해 회수 시기를 늦췄으며, 두 번째 포이즌 필(poison pill)과 소송 등 경영진을 보호하는 방어 조치를 취했다고 비난합니다. 주주는 이 같은 조치들이 사업 보호가 아니라 경영진의 지위 공고화에 불과하다고 말합니다.

주주는 합의 및 잠재적 자금 조달 논의에 응할 의사가 있다고 밝혔지만, 이사회가 건설적 해결책을 거부하고 자격 있는 이사 후보자들을 차단했다고 주장합니다. 회사는 공개적으로 "부채 조달, 주식 발행 등 잠재적 자금원 조사를 진행 중"이라고 밝혔습니다. 제출 문서에는 회사의 연금 계획이 약 520,000주의 BRN 주식을 매입했다는 주장도 포함되어 있습니다.

Un actionnaire détenant 30 % des parts affirme que le conseil d'administration de Barnwell Industries a dépensé, en six mois, presque la totalité des quelque 2 millions de dollars de trésorerie de la société pour s'opposer à ses tentatives de nomination de administrateurs, accélérant ainsi les pertes de trésorerie et détruisant la valeur pour les actionnaires. Le dossier accuse le conseil d'avoir vendu un investissement au Texas en réalisant une perte d'environ 3 millions de dollars pour lever des liquidités, d'avoir modifié des billets à ordre liés à un paiement lié à la vente d'eau en retardant les encaissements, et d'avoir pris des mesures défensives — y compris un second poison pill et des actions judiciaires — qui, selon l'actionnaire, consolident la position de la direction plutôt que de protéger l'entreprise.

L'actionnaire déclare être disposé à discuter de règlements et de financements potentiels, mais affirme que le conseil a refusé des solutions constructives et bloqué des candidats administrateurs qualifiés, tandis que la société a publiquement indiqué qu'elle "enquêtait sur des sources potentielles de financement, y compris un financement par emprunt et l'émission d'actions." Le dossier allègue également que le régime de retraite de la société a acheté environ 520 000 actions de BRN.

Ein 30%-Aktionär behauptet, der Vorstand von Barnwell Industries habe in sechs Monaten fast das gesamte Bargeld des Unternehmens von rund 2 Millionen Dollar ausgegeben, um die Versuche des Aktionärs, Direktoren zu nominieren, abzuwehren, wodurch der Barverlust beschleunigt und der Aktionärswert zerstört worden sei. Die Einreichung wirft dem Vorstand vor, eine Investition in Texas mit einem Verlust von etwa 3 Millionen Dollar verkauft zu haben, um Liquidität zu beschaffen, Wechsel (Promissory Notes) im Zusammenhang mit einer Wasserverkaufszahlung geändert und Einzüge verzögert sowie Abwehrmaßnahmen – darunter eine zweite Poison Pill und rechtliche Schritte – ergriffen zu haben, die laut Aktionär das Management verfestigten, anstatt das Geschäft zu schützen.

Der Aktionär gibt an, zu Vergleichen und möglichen Finanzierungen bereit zu sein, sagt aber, der Vorstand habe konstruktive Lösungen abgelehnt und qualifizierte Direktorenkandidaten blockiert, während das Unternehmen öffentlich erklärt habe, es "prüfe potenzielle Finanzierungsquellen, einschließlich Fremdkapitalfinanzierung und Aktienemission." Die Einreichung behauptet außerdem, der Pensionsplan des Unternehmens habe etwa 520.000 Aktien von BRN gekauft.

 

 

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

 

 

 

SCHEDULE 14A

 

 

 

Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934

 

Filed by the Registrant
Filed by a party other than the Registrant

 

Check the appropriate box:

 

Preliminary Proxy Statement
   
Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
   
Definitive Proxy Statement
   
Definitive Additional Materials
   
Soliciting Material under § 240.14a-12

 

BARNWELL INDUSTRIES, Inc.

 

(Exact name of registrant as specified in charter)

 

Ned L. Sherwood
MRMP-Managers LLC
Ned L. Sherwood Revocable Trust
Brian Henry
Heather Isidoro
Benjamin Pierson
Douglas Woodrum

 

 (Name of Persons Filing Consent Statement if other than the Registrant)

 

Payment of Filing Fee (Check all boxes that apply):

 

No fee required
   
Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.
   
Fee computed on table in exhibit required by Item 25(b) per Exchange Act Rules 14a- 6(i)(1) and 0-11

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

 

Barnwell’s Largest Shareholder Demands Investigation Into $3 Million Texas Loss and Urges Action to Recover Millions for Investors

 

Vero Beach, Florida, August 21, 2025 – The Sherwood Group, a long-term and significant shareholder with approximately 29.90% of the issued and outstanding shares of Barnwell Industries, Inc. (“Barnwell” or “BRN”), issued the following letter today to shareholders of Barnwell:

 

Dear Fellow Shareholders of Barnwell Industries, Inc.:

 

As many of you know, I am a 30% shareholder of Barnwell. I was distressed to read Barnwell Industries, Inc.’s (“BRN” or “Barnwell”) latest quarterly report for the period ending June 30, 2025. BRN continues to hemorrhage cash as shown in the following chart:

 

Quarter Ending  Cash from
Operations
   Capital
Expenditures
   Free
Cash Flow
 
12/31/24  $(759,000)  $(2,529,000)  $(3,288,000)
03/31/25  $(95,000)  $(112,000)  $(207,000)
06/30/25  $(309,000)  $(313,000)  $(622,000)
Nine Months Ending 06/30/25  $(1,163,000)  $(2,954,000)  $(4,117,000)

 

Quarter Ending  Cash
Balances
   Non-Cash
Working
Capital
   Cash
Balances
Less
Non-Cash
Working
Capital
 
12/31/24  $1,957,000   $(1,315,000)  $642,000 
03/31/25  $1,432,000   $(1,489,000)  $(57,000)
06/30/25  $1,154,000   $(2,475,000)  $(1,321,000)

 

Based on the figures shown above, it is understandable why BRN’s auditors have issued a “going concern” warning for the Company’s financials. Obviously BRN’s results are disastrous, and the Company’s Board and management should be cutting all unnecessary expenses to the bone.

 

However, since my last letter to you on June 20, 2025, the sole remaining board members of Barnwell, Ken Grossman and Josh Horowitz (the “BRN Directors”) who collectively hold approximately 4.8% of the Company’s outstanding shares, have managed to:

 

Push the company further towards insolvency through their endless waste of resources fighting me, a 30% shareholder of the Company, by recklessly spending nearly all of Barnwell’s $2 million of cash balances over the past six months, which has destroyed shareholder value, only to block a fair and open election of Directors, in order, to entrench themselves. Their spending was done even knowing that Barnwell has been cash flow negative as show in the chart.

 

1

 

 

Lock in an approximately $3 million loss on the Texas investment that was made in December of 2022, an investment that never should have been made in the first place and was sold because cash was needed to replenish their reckless spending, which is likely to result in even higher amounts of negative cash flow from operations going forward (more on that later). In essence, BRN has resorted to “eating their seed corn” in order to survive over the near term.

 

Adjourn the annual meeting AGAIN simply so they don’t have to open a new window and allow shareholders the opportunity to submit qualified candidates for the Board.

 

Refuse to engage in any productive discussions with me on settlement matters and ignore any and all qualified candidates that I put forth. The most egregious aspect of this is that the latest BRN earnings release notes the Company is “investigating potential sources of funding, including debt financing, issuance of stock….”; every settlement proposal that I have put forth has indicated that I might have been willing to buy future shares of the Company directly and would have considered other financing options but the BRN Directors were not interested in solutions that did not include them, as they cared more about their precious board seats.

 

Fail at collecting the paltry amount of cash previously promised to the Company from the Water sale; instead, amending promissory notes and pushing out payment dates – thereby delaying needed cash and risking a default by the new owners.

 

Of, course none of this is surprising. Mr. Grossman and Mr. Horowitz have, in my opinion, repeatedly violated their fiduciary duties.

 

Most recently, I sent these BRN Directors a letter detailing my grave concerns with the Texas investment that was made in December of 2022 (and was just sold for an aggregate approximately $3 million loss). The Texas investment of approximately $5.3 million was advocated under the direction and advice of former CEO and former Director, Alex Kinzler (and other Directors who voted in favor of it, including Phil McPherson (the candidate chosen by Grossman and Horowitz to rejoin the Board)).

 

I requested that the Barnwell Board investigate the Texas investment because I believe there were serious issues with how that investment was approved, leading to a catastrophic investment by the Company, resulting in multi-millions of dollars of lost profits for shareholders and lost opportunity. The Company’s most recent earnings release confirms that the investment has led to a significant loss. After consulting with counsel in Delaware, we are confident that the Company has strong claims for damages against Kinzler, McPherson and possibly others as a result of the Texas investment, but Grossman and Horowitz refuse to move any such investigation forward, clearly to protect Kinzler and others at the detriment of the Company and its shareholders.

 

In their response, Grossman and Horowitz claimed that they would “only recommend the Board to consider the retention of independent legal counsel to investigate” the Texas investment after the 2025 annual meeting is held and director candidates Hopkins and McPherson are elected to the Board.

 

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First of all, how is having McPherson on the Board helpful at all when he was one of the reasons the Company made this devastating investment? In fact, the BRN Directors should be evaluating his suitability as a candidate to re-join the Barnwell Board in light of that investment, among other qualification issues.

 

Second, the other director candidate Hopkins is the current CEO of the Company. To the extent they need his counsel or thoughts on an investigation that could bring millions into a Company that is having issues continuing as a going concern, they can ask him now, can’t they?

 

Finally, while they claim they need a full complement of directors in order to decide whether to investigate claims that could return millions of dollars back to shareholders, why did they have no problem agreeing to sell two significant assets of the Company as disclosed in the latest quarterly report without a full complement of directors?

 

I would encourage all shareholders to contact the BRN Directors and demand transparency on the Texas investment. Despite two formal books and records requests and an informal request on my part, the Company continues to refuse to provide me with any information.

 

It is my belief that the BRN Directors are purposely delaying an investigation into the Texas investment. This could result in the Company losing its ability to pursue such claims, further damaging the Company and its shareholders.

 

On top of their repeated breaches of fiduciary duty, Grossman and Horowitz refuse to engage in any real dialogue even though they incessantly blame me in every earnings release or report they put out for issues and trouble they CHOSE to cause.

 

I did not make them waste Company resources and hire Skadden, Arps to adopt a second poison pill, an act they claim is protecting the Company when the only thing it is doing is protecting their board seats and ensuring that I cannot buy stock. Of course, it doesn’t stop them from using the Company’s pension plan to buy approximately 520,000 shares of BRN stock!

 

I did not make them hire Skadden, Arps to strip away the right of a shareholder to call a special meeting, a right that I had to fight to get back through the consent solicitation process.

 

I did not make them hire 4 different law firms to seek to disqualify my advance notice for the annual meeting on technicality, they CHOSE to do that, and, in doing so, robbed all Barnwell shareholders of very highly qualified board candidates.

 

I am not preventing them from getting a quorum. Any shareholder is welcome to change their vote to Management’s white card if they believe that the BRN Directors are being good stewards of Barnwell. Clearly, based on the preliminary vote counts, shareholders are resoundingly keeping their vote on the green card.

 

3

 

 

It is clear that something is very wrong about the board governance at BRN. It is very clear that they would rather spend Company dollars until they run out of cash resources to keep me and any candidate that I put forth off the Board (despite almost majority support from the shareholders for such candidates). It is clear they care only about protecting their board seats and Kinzler rather than investigating an investment that could reap millions in damages for the Company and its shareholders.

 

BRN’s current financial situation shows that the Company is on very shaky ground. Furthermore, as Grossman and Horowitz sell off BRN’s operating assets to stave off insolvency (caused by their wasteful legal spending to entrench themselves), there is little left to save for the equity shareholders (like me).

 

Obviously a $10.0 - $15.0 million possible breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit recovery against Kinzler and many of the current and past directors would result in giving BRN’s shareholders a chance at a better future.

 

In my opinion, Grossman and Horowitz must immediately pursue any possible recoveries that stem from improper actions of Kinzler and certain other directors who were on the Board in 2022 at the time of the Texas investment (including Peter O’Malley, Frank Kelly and Phil McPherson) before the statute of limitations on this improper transaction expires.

 

As a 30% shareholder (and BRN’s largest single shareholder), all this imprudent value-destroying spending impacts me more than anyone else, and I am not happy about it. I implore the BRN Directors to investigate the Texas investment now before it is too late. I believe they have a fiduciary duty to act now.

 

Sincerely,

 

/s/ Ned L. Sherwood  
Ned L. Sherwood  

 

Voting Results 

 

Preliminary voting results are not final and may not reflect the ultimate outcome. Shareholders who have already voted may revoke their proxy and submit a new one at any time up to and including the meeting date. The Sherwood Group strongly urges shareholders not to give undue weight to the preliminary voting results and, instead, to consider all material facts concerning the election before making their voting decisions with respect to the annual meeting.

 

If you previously voted on the Green card and wish your vote to count for purpose of the quorum and NOT for directors you previously selected, then you are free to vote the Barnwell White card.

 

For media inquiries or further information, please contact:

 

Alyssa Barry

Media Relations, Alliance Advisors

abarry@allianceadvisors.com

 

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