STOCK TITAN

[8-K] F5, INC. Reports Material Event

Filing Impact
(Moderate)
Filing Sentiment
(Neutral)
Form Type
8-K

F5, Inc. reported a cybersecurity incident involving a highly sophisticated nation-state actor that gained long-term access to certain systems, including the BIG-IP product development environment and engineering knowledge platform. The company says containment actions have been successful and has not observed new unauthorized activity since initiating its response. Some files were exfiltrated, including portions of BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities the company was working on. F5 states it is not aware of undisclosed critical or remote code vulnerabilities or active exploitation, and independent experts validated no modification to its software supply chain.

F5 reports no evidence of access to CRM, financial, support case management, or iHealth systems; there is also no evidence of access to NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services, or Silverline. The U.S. Department of Justice permitted delayed disclosure on September 12, 2025. As of this disclosure, operations have not been materially impacted, and the financial impact is being evaluated. Separately, Michael Montoya resigned from the Board on October 9, 2025, and became Chief Technology Operations Officer effective October 13, 2025; the Board size is now ten members.

F5, Inc. ha riportato un incidente di cybersicurezza riguardante un attore statale altamente sofisticato che ha ottenuto l'accesso a lungo termine a determinati sistemi, inclusi l'ambiente di sviluppo del prodotto BIG-IP e la piattaforma di conoscenza ingegneristica. L'azienda afferma che le azioni di contenimento hanno avuto successo e non ha osservato nuove attività non autorizzate dall'inizio della risposta. Alcuni file sono stati esfiltrati, tra cui porzioni del codice sorgente BIG-IP e informazioni su vulnerabilità non divulgate su cui l'azienda stava lavorando. F5 dichiara di non essere a conoscenza di vulnerabilità critiche non divulgate o di esecuzioni di codice remoto non attive, e esperti indipendenti hanno convalidato che non vi sono modifiche alla catena di fornitura software.

F5 riferisce di non avere prove di accesso a CRM, sistemi finanziari, gestione dei casi di supporto o iHealth; non ci sono inoltre prove di accesso a NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services o Silverline. Il Dipartimento di Giustizia degli Stati Uniti ha autorizzato una divulgazione differita il 12 settembre 2025. Al momento di questa divulgazione, le operazioni non sono state materialmente influenzate e l'impatto finanziario è in fase di valutazione. Separatamente, Michael Montoya si è dimesso dal Board il 9 ottobre 2025 ed è diventato Chief Technology Operations Officer a partire dal 13 ottobre 2025; la dimensione del consiglio di amministrazione è ora di dieci membri.

F5, Inc. informó de un incidente de ciberseguridad ocurrido por un actor estatal de alto nivel de sofisticación que obtuvo acceso a largo plazo a ciertos sistemas, incluido el entorno de desarrollo del producto BIG-IP y la plataforma de conocimiento de ingeniería. La empresa dice que las medidas de contención han tenido éxito y no ha observado nueva actividad no autorizada desde que inició su respuesta. Se exfiltraron algunos archivos, incluidas partes del código fuente de BIG-IP e información sobre vulnerabilidades no divulgadas en las que la empresa estaba trabajando. F5 afirma que no tiene conocimiento de vulnerabilidades críticas no divulgadas o ejecuciones de código remoto activas, y expertos independientes validaron que no hubo modificaciones en la cadena de suministro de software.

F5 informa que no hay evidencia de acceso a los sistemas CRM, financieros, gestión de casos de soporte o iHealth; tampoco hay evidencia de acceso a NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services o Silverline. El Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos autorizó la divulgación diferida el 12 de septiembre de 2025. A la fecha de esta divulgación, las operaciones no se han visto afectadas de manera material y el impacto financiero se está evaluando. Por separado, Michael Montoya presentó su renuncia al Consejo el 9 de octubre de 2025 y pasó a ser Chief Technology Operations Officer a partir del 13 de octubre de 2025; el tamaño del Consejo es ahora de diez miembros.

F5, Inc.은 사이버보안 사고를 보고했습니다고도로 정교한 국가 주도 행위자가 특정 시스템에 장기적으로 접근할 수 있게 되었으며, BIG-IP 제품 개발 환경과 엔지니어링 지식 플랫폼도 포함됩니다. 회사는 차단 조치가 성공적으로 이루어졌다고 말했으며 대응을 시작한 이래로 무단 활동이 새로 관찰되지 않았다고 했습니다. 일부 파일이 탈취되었으며 BIG-IP 소스 코드의 일부 및 회사가 작업 중이던 미공개 취약점에 대한 정보가 포함됩니다. F5는 미공개 중요 취약점이나 원격 코드 실행의 활발한 악용에 대해 인지하지 못하고 있으며, 독립 전문가들이 소프트웨어 공급망에 대한 수정이 없음을 확인했습니다.

F5는 CRM, 재무, 지원 사례 관리 또는 iHealth 시스템에 대한 접근 증거가 없다고 보고합니다. 또한 NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services 또는 Silverline에 대한 접근 증거도 없습니다. 미국 법무부는 2025년 9월 12일에 연기된 공표를 허용했습니다. 이번 공표 시점까지 운영은 실질적으로 영향을 받지 않았고 재정적 영향은 평가 중입니다. Separately, Michael Montoya는 2025년 10월 9일 이사회에서 물러났고 2025년 10월 13일부로 Chief Technology Operations Officer가 되었으며 이사회 규모는 현재 10명으로 늘었습니다.

F5, Inc. a signalé un incident de cybersécurité impliquant un acteur étatique extrêmement sophistiqué qui a obtenu un accès à long terme à certains systèmes, y compris l'environnement de développement du produit BIG-IP et la plateforme de connaissances en ingénierie. L'entreprise dit que les mesures de confinement ont réussi et n'a pas observé de nouvelle activité non autorisée depuis le déclenchement de sa réponse. Certains fichiers ont été exfiltrés, y compris des portions du code source BIG-IP et des informations sur des vulnérabilités non divulguées sur lesquelles l'entreprise travaillait. F5 précise qu'elle n'est pas au courant de vulnérabilités critiques non divulguées ou d'exécutions de code à distance actives, et des experts indépendants ont validé qu'il n'y a pas de modification de la chaîne d'approvisionnement logicielle.

F5 indique qu'il n'y a aucune preuve d'accès aux systèmes CRM, financiers, de gestion des cas de support ou d'iHealth; il n'y a pas non plus de preuve d'accès à NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services ou Silverline. Le Department of Justice des États-Unis a autorisé la divulgation différée le 12 septembre 2025. À ce jour, les opérations n'ont pas été affectées de manière matérielle, et l'impact financier est en cours d'évaluation. Par ailleurs, Michael Montoya a démissionné du conseil le 9 octobre 2025 et est devenu Chief Technology Operations Officer à compter du 13 octobre 2025; la taille du conseil est désormais de dix membres.

F5, Inc. meldete einen Cybersecurity-Vorfall, der von einem hochsophistizierten Akteur eines Nationalstaats verursacht wurde und der langfristigen Zugang zu bestimmten Systemen erlangt hat, einschließlich der BIG-IP-Produktentwicklungsumgebung und der Plattform für Ingenieurswissen. Das Unternehmen sagt, dass Abwehrmaßnahmen erfolgreich waren und seit Beginn der Reaktion keine neuen unbefugten Aktivitäten beobachtet wurden. Einige Dateien wurden exfiltriert, darunter Teile des BIG-IP-Quellcodes und Informationen über nicht offengelegte Schwachstellen, an denen das Unternehmen arbeitete. F5 erklärt, dass es keine Kenntnis von nicht offengelegten kritischen Schwachstellen oder aktiver Ausnutzung gibt, und unabhängige Experten bestätigten, dass keine Änderungen an der Softwarelieferkette vorgenommen wurden.

F5 meldet keine Hinweise auf Zugriff auf CRM-, Finanz-, Fallverwaltungs- oder iHealth-Systeme; es gibt auch keine Hinweise auf Zugriff auf NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services oder Silverline. Das US-Justizministerium genehmigte eine verzögerte Offenlegung am 12. September 2025. Zum Zeitpunkt dieser Offenlegung waren die Betriebsvorgänge nicht wesentlich betroffen, und die finanziellen Auswirkungen werden bewertet. Separat trat Michael Montoya am 9. Oktober 2025 vom Vorstand zurück und wurde zum Chief Technology Operations Officer ab dem 13. Oktober 2025; die Größe des Vorstands beträgt nun zehn Mitglieder.

أف 5، إنك. أبلغت عن حادثة أمن سيبراني نفذها جهة فاعلة من دولة ذات سيادة عالية التطور والتي حصلت على وصول طويل الأمد إلى بعض الأنظمة، بما في ذلك بيئة تطوير منتج BIG-IP ومنصة المعرفة الهندسية. تقول الشركة إن إجراءات الاحتواء نجحت ولم تلاحظ نشاطًا غير مصرح به جديدًا منذ بدء الاستجابة. تم سحب بعض الملفات، بما في ذلك أجزاء من شفرة المصدر BIG_IP ومعلومات عن ثغرات غير مكشوفة كانت الشركة تعمل عليها. تشير F5 إلى أنها ليست على علم بثغرات حرجة غير مُعلنة أو استغلال عن بُعد نشط، كما أن خبراء مستقلين صادقوا على أنه لم تتم أي تعديلات في سلسلة توريد البرمجيات.

تفيد F5 بأنه لا يوجد دليل على وصول إلى أنظمة CRM أو مالية أو إدارة حالات الدعم أو iHealth؛ كما لا يوجد دليل على وصول إلى NGINX أو Distributed Cloud Services أو Silverline. سمحت وزارة العدل الأمريكية بالإفشاء المتأخر في 12 سبتمبر 2025. حتى تاريخ هذا الكشف، لم تتأثر العمليات بشكل كبير، وسيتم تقييم الأثر المالي. كما استقال مايكل مونتويّا من المجلس في 9 أكتوبر 2025 وتولى منصب Chief Technology Operations Officer اعتباراً من 13 أكتوبر 2025؛ يبلغ عدد أعضاء المجلس الآن عشر أعضاء.

F5, Inc. 报告了一起网络安全事件,涉及一名高度成熟的国家级行为者,该行为者获得对某些系统的长期访问权限,包括 BIG-IP 产品开发环境和工程知识平台。公司表示遏制措施已取得成功,自启动应对以来未观察到新的未授权活动。部分文件被外泄,包括 BIG-IP 源代码的部分内容以及公司正在开展工作但未披露的漏洞信息。F5 表示并不知悉未披露的关键漏洞或远程代码执行的活跃利用,独立专家也确认软件供应链未被修改。

F5 报告称未发现对 CRM、财务、支持案例管理或 iHealth 系统的访问证据;也未发现对 NGINX、Distributed Cloud Services 或 Silverline 的访问证据。美国司法部在 2025 年 9 月 12 日允许延迟披露。截至本披露之日,运营没有受到实质性影响,财务影响正在评估中。另据报道,迈克尔·蒙托亚于 2025 年 10 月 9 日辞去董事会职务并于 2025 年 10 月 13 日起担任 Chief Technology Operations Officer;董事会现有成员为十人。

Positive
  • None.
Negative
  • None.

Insights

Significant breach disclosed; containment reported, impact under evaluation.

F5 reports a nation-state intrusion with persistent access to the BIG-IP development environment and knowledge systems. Exfiltrated materials include portions of BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities under remediation. The company reports no evidence of supply chain modification, with this assessment validated by independent firms.

Operationally, F5 cites no material impact as of the disclosure. There is no evidence of access to CRM, financial, support case management, or iHealth data, and no evidence of access to NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services, or Silverline. Actual commercial impact will hinge on customer communications and remediation steps described.

Governance-wise, Michael Montoya resigned from the Board on October 9, 2025 and became Chief Technology Operations Officer on October 13, 2025, centralizing security operations under the CEO. Disclosure timing followed a September 12, 2025 DoJ determination permitting delay under Item 1.05(c).

F5, Inc. ha riportato un incidente di cybersicurezza riguardante un attore statale altamente sofisticato che ha ottenuto l'accesso a lungo termine a determinati sistemi, inclusi l'ambiente di sviluppo del prodotto BIG-IP e la piattaforma di conoscenza ingegneristica. L'azienda afferma che le azioni di contenimento hanno avuto successo e non ha osservato nuove attività non autorizzate dall'inizio della risposta. Alcuni file sono stati esfiltrati, tra cui porzioni del codice sorgente BIG-IP e informazioni su vulnerabilità non divulgate su cui l'azienda stava lavorando. F5 dichiara di non essere a conoscenza di vulnerabilità critiche non divulgate o di esecuzioni di codice remoto non attive, e esperti indipendenti hanno convalidato che non vi sono modifiche alla catena di fornitura software.

F5 riferisce di non avere prove di accesso a CRM, sistemi finanziari, gestione dei casi di supporto o iHealth; non ci sono inoltre prove di accesso a NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services o Silverline. Il Dipartimento di Giustizia degli Stati Uniti ha autorizzato una divulgazione differita il 12 settembre 2025. Al momento di questa divulgazione, le operazioni non sono state materialmente influenzate e l'impatto finanziario è in fase di valutazione. Separatamente, Michael Montoya si è dimesso dal Board il 9 ottobre 2025 ed è diventato Chief Technology Operations Officer a partire dal 13 ottobre 2025; la dimensione del consiglio di amministrazione è ora di dieci membri.

F5, Inc. informó de un incidente de ciberseguridad ocurrido por un actor estatal de alto nivel de sofisticación que obtuvo acceso a largo plazo a ciertos sistemas, incluido el entorno de desarrollo del producto BIG-IP y la plataforma de conocimiento de ingeniería. La empresa dice que las medidas de contención han tenido éxito y no ha observado nueva actividad no autorizada desde que inició su respuesta. Se exfiltraron algunos archivos, incluidas partes del código fuente de BIG-IP e información sobre vulnerabilidades no divulgadas en las que la empresa estaba trabajando. F5 afirma que no tiene conocimiento de vulnerabilidades críticas no divulgadas o ejecuciones de código remoto activas, y expertos independientes validaron que no hubo modificaciones en la cadena de suministro de software.

F5 informa que no hay evidencia de acceso a los sistemas CRM, financieros, gestión de casos de soporte o iHealth; tampoco hay evidencia de acceso a NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services o Silverline. El Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos autorizó la divulgación diferida el 12 de septiembre de 2025. A la fecha de esta divulgación, las operaciones no se han visto afectadas de manera material y el impacto financiero se está evaluando. Por separado, Michael Montoya presentó su renuncia al Consejo el 9 de octubre de 2025 y pasó a ser Chief Technology Operations Officer a partir del 13 de octubre de 2025; el tamaño del Consejo es ahora de diez miembros.

F5, Inc.은 사이버보안 사고를 보고했습니다고도로 정교한 국가 주도 행위자가 특정 시스템에 장기적으로 접근할 수 있게 되었으며, BIG-IP 제품 개발 환경과 엔지니어링 지식 플랫폼도 포함됩니다. 회사는 차단 조치가 성공적으로 이루어졌다고 말했으며 대응을 시작한 이래로 무단 활동이 새로 관찰되지 않았다고 했습니다. 일부 파일이 탈취되었으며 BIG-IP 소스 코드의 일부 및 회사가 작업 중이던 미공개 취약점에 대한 정보가 포함됩니다. F5는 미공개 중요 취약점이나 원격 코드 실행의 활발한 악용에 대해 인지하지 못하고 있으며, 독립 전문가들이 소프트웨어 공급망에 대한 수정이 없음을 확인했습니다.

F5는 CRM, 재무, 지원 사례 관리 또는 iHealth 시스템에 대한 접근 증거가 없다고 보고합니다. 또한 NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services 또는 Silverline에 대한 접근 증거도 없습니다. 미국 법무부는 2025년 9월 12일에 연기된 공표를 허용했습니다. 이번 공표 시점까지 운영은 실질적으로 영향을 받지 않았고 재정적 영향은 평가 중입니다. Separately, Michael Montoya는 2025년 10월 9일 이사회에서 물러났고 2025년 10월 13일부로 Chief Technology Operations Officer가 되었으며 이사회 규모는 현재 10명으로 늘었습니다.

F5, Inc. a signalé un incident de cybersécurité impliquant un acteur étatique extrêmement sophistiqué qui a obtenu un accès à long terme à certains systèmes, y compris l'environnement de développement du produit BIG-IP et la plateforme de connaissances en ingénierie. L'entreprise dit que les mesures de confinement ont réussi et n'a pas observé de nouvelle activité non autorisée depuis le déclenchement de sa réponse. Certains fichiers ont été exfiltrés, y compris des portions du code source BIG-IP et des informations sur des vulnérabilités non divulguées sur lesquelles l'entreprise travaillait. F5 précise qu'elle n'est pas au courant de vulnérabilités critiques non divulguées ou d'exécutions de code à distance actives, et des experts indépendants ont validé qu'il n'y a pas de modification de la chaîne d'approvisionnement logicielle.

F5 indique qu'il n'y a aucune preuve d'accès aux systèmes CRM, financiers, de gestion des cas de support ou d'iHealth; il n'y a pas non plus de preuve d'accès à NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services ou Silverline. Le Department of Justice des États-Unis a autorisé la divulgation différée le 12 septembre 2025. À ce jour, les opérations n'ont pas été affectées de manière matérielle, et l'impact financier est en cours d'évaluation. Par ailleurs, Michael Montoya a démissionné du conseil le 9 octobre 2025 et est devenu Chief Technology Operations Officer à compter du 13 octobre 2025; la taille du conseil est désormais de dix membres.

F5, Inc. meldete einen Cybersecurity-Vorfall, der von einem hochsophistizierten Akteur eines Nationalstaats verursacht wurde und der langfristigen Zugang zu bestimmten Systemen erlangt hat, einschließlich der BIG-IP-Produktentwicklungsumgebung und der Plattform für Ingenieurswissen. Das Unternehmen sagt, dass Abwehrmaßnahmen erfolgreich waren und seit Beginn der Reaktion keine neuen unbefugten Aktivitäten beobachtet wurden. Einige Dateien wurden exfiltriert, darunter Teile des BIG-IP-Quellcodes und Informationen über nicht offengelegte Schwachstellen, an denen das Unternehmen arbeitete. F5 erklärt, dass es keine Kenntnis von nicht offengelegten kritischen Schwachstellen oder aktiver Ausnutzung gibt, und unabhängige Experten bestätigten, dass keine Änderungen an der Softwarelieferkette vorgenommen wurden.

F5 meldet keine Hinweise auf Zugriff auf CRM-, Finanz-, Fallverwaltungs- oder iHealth-Systeme; es gibt auch keine Hinweise auf Zugriff auf NGINX, Distributed Cloud Services oder Silverline. Das US-Justizministerium genehmigte eine verzögerte Offenlegung am 12. September 2025. Zum Zeitpunkt dieser Offenlegung waren die Betriebsvorgänge nicht wesentlich betroffen, und die finanziellen Auswirkungen werden bewertet. Separat trat Michael Montoya am 9. Oktober 2025 vom Vorstand zurück und wurde zum Chief Technology Operations Officer ab dem 13. Oktober 2025; die Größe des Vorstands beträgt nun zehn Mitglieder.

0001048695false00010486952025-10-152025-10-15

 
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Date of Report (Date of Earliest Event Reported):
October 15, 2025
F5, Inc.
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
Washington000-2604191-1714307
(State or other jurisdiction(Commission(IRS Employer
of incorporation)File Number)Identification No.)
801 5th Avenue
Seattle,WA98104
(Address of principal executive offices)(Zip Code)
Registrant’s telephone number, including area code (206272-5555
Not Applicable
Former name or former address, if changed since last report
Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions:
Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)
Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)
Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))
Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))
Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act:
Title of each classTrading Symbol(s)Name of each exchange on which registered
Common stock, no par valueFFIVNASDAQ Global Select Market
Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is an emerging growth company as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933 (§230.405 of this chapter) or Rule 12b-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (§240.12b-2 of this chapter). Emerging growth company
If an emerging growth company, indicate by check mark if the registrant has elected not to use the extended transition period for complying with any new or revised financial accounting standards provided pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act.



Item 1.05Material Cybersecurity Incidents
On August 9, 2025, F5, Inc. (the “Company”, “F5”, “we”, or “our”) learned that a highly sophisticated nation-state threat actor had gained unauthorized access to certain Company systems. The Company promptly activated its incident response processes, and has taken extensive actions to contain the threat actor. To support these activities, the Company engaged leading external cybersecurity experts.
The Company believes its containment actions have been successful and, since the initiation of its containment efforts, has not observed any evidence of new unauthorized activity. The investigation, monitoring, and related activities are ongoing. The Company is actively engaged with federal law enforcement and government partners in connection with this incident. Additionally, the Company is implementing further measures to strengthen its security environment and protect its customers.
During the course of its investigation, the Company determined that the threat actor maintained long-term, persistent access to certain F5 systems, including the BIG-IP product development environment and engineering knowledge management platform. Through this access, certain files were exfiltrated, some of which contained certain portions of the Company’s BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities that it was working on in BIG-IP. We are not aware of any undisclosed critical or remote code vulnerabilities, and we are not aware of active exploitation of any undisclosed F5 vulnerabilities. We have no evidence of modification to our software supply chain, including our source code and our build and release pipelines. This assessment has been validated through independent reviews by leading cybersecurity research firms.
We have no evidence of access to, or exfiltration of, data from our CRM, financial, support case management, or iHealth systems. However, some of the exfiltrated files from our knowledge management platform contained configuration or implementation information for a small percentage of customers. The Company is currently reviewing the contents of these files and will communicate with affected customers directly as appropriate.
We have no evidence that the threat actor accessed or modified the NGINX source code or product development environment, nor do we have evidence they accessed or modified our F5 Distributed Cloud Services or Silverline systems.
On September 12, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice determined that a delay in public disclosure was warranted pursuant to Item 1.05(c) of Form 8-K. F5 is now filing this report in a timely manner.
As of the date of this disclosure, this incident has not had a material impact on the Company’s operations, and the Company is evaluating the impact this incident may reasonably have on its financial condition or results of operations.
Item 5.02Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers
On October 9, 2025, Michael Montoya resigned, effective immediately, from his position as a director of F5’s Board of Directors (the “Board”), including his memberships on the Risk Committee and Nominating and Environmental, Social and Governance Committee. His decision to resign from the Board was not the result of any disagreement with the Company. 
Mr. Montoya has been a valuable member of the Board and following his resignation from the Board, Mr. Montoya continued his service with the Company and has been appointed as F5’s Chief Technology Operations Officer, effective October 13, 2025, reporting directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Montoya will lead the enterprise-wide strategy and execution to build and operate the Company with security at its core.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Nominating and Environmental, Social and Governance Committee and in connection with Mr. Montoya’s resignation, the Board reduced the size of the Board from eleven to ten members. As a result of such reduction, there are currently no vacancies on the Board.
Item 7.01Regulation FD Disclosure
On October 15, 2025, F5 posted certain information regarding the incident on its MyF5 customer support site. A copy of that posting is furnished as Exhibit 99.1 to this report.
The information in this Item 7.01 and Exhibit 99.1 shall not be deemed to be “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), or otherwise subject to the liability of that section, and shall not be incorporated by reference into any registration statement or other document filed under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except as shall be expressly set forth by specific reference in such filing.



Forward Looking Statements
Certain statements made in this report by F5, which are not historical facts are forward-looking statements subject to the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties which we expect will or may occur in the future and may impact our business, financial condition and results of operations. The words “believe,” “expect,” “may,” “will,” “should,” “could,” and similar expressions are intended to identify those forward-looking statements, although there may be other such statements that do not use such wording. Such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding the Company’s containment efforts, the results of the Company’s ongoing investigation of the incident, and the impact of the incident on the Company. These forward-looking statements reflect the Company’s best judgment based on current information, and, although we base these statements on circumstances that we believe to be reasonable when made, there can be no assurance that future events will not affect the accuracy of such forward-looking information. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future events or circumstances and may vary materially from that discussed in this report. Factors that might cause the Company’s actual results to differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to: the Company’s ongoing assessment of the impacts of the cybersecurity incident, including the Company’s potential discovery of additional information related to the incident in connection with its investigation or otherwise; the Company’s expectations regarding its ability to contain and remediate the cybersecurity incident; the impact of the cybersecurity incident on the Company’s relationships with customers, employees, and governmental authorities; the legal, reputational, and financial risks resulting from the cybersecurity incident, including risks, which may arise from any potential regulatory inquiries or litigation to which the Company may become subject in connection with the incident; remediation and other additional costs that may be incurred and borne by the Company in connection with the investigation and remediation of the incident; and the risks and uncertainties discussed in the Company’s annual and quarterly (including the risk factor sections) and other reports and materials provided to the SEC. F5 disclaims any obligation to update or revise any statement contained in this report except as required by law.
Item 9.01Financial Statements and Exhibits
(d) Exhibits:
Exhibit No.Exhibit Description
99.1
Website Post dated October 15, 2025 titled "F5 Security Incident"
104.0Cover Page Interactive Data File (embedded within the Inline XBRL document)



SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
F5, INC.
 (Registrant)
  
Date: October 15, 2025By:/s/ François Locoh-Donou
François Locoh-Donou
President and Chief Executive Officer


FAQ

What did F5 (FFIV) disclose about the cybersecurity incident?

F5 reported that a nation-state actor gained long-term access to certain systems, exfiltrating portions of BIG-IP source code and information on undisclosed vulnerabilities.

Did the F5 (FFIV) incident affect customer or financial systems?

F5 has no evidence of access to CRM, financial, support case management, or iHealth systems; some exfiltrated files included configuration or implementation information for a small percentage of customers.

Were NGINX or F5’s cloud services impacted?

F5 has no evidence that NGINX source code or development, or its Distributed Cloud Services or Silverline systems, were accessed or modified.

Has F5 (FFIV) contained the threat and is there active exploitation?

F5 believes containment was successful and has seen no new unauthorized activity; it is not aware of active exploitation of undisclosed F5 vulnerabilities.

Why was disclosure delayed and when?

The U.S. Department of Justice determined on September 12, 2025, that delay was warranted under Item 1.05(c).

What leadership changes did F5 (FFIV) announce?

Michael Montoya resigned from the Board on October 9, 2025, and became Chief Technology Operations Officer effective October 13, 2025; the Board was reduced to ten members.

Has the incident materially impacted F5’s operations or finances?

As of this disclosure, F5 states operations have not been materially impacted and it is evaluating potential financial effects.
F5 INC

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