[PX14A6G] SYSCO CORP SEC Filing
The Accountability Board filed a PX14A6G notice urging Sysco shareholders to vote FOR Item 4, which requests a policy to separate the Board Chair and CEO roles. The filer notes this is a voluntary submission under Rule 14a-6(g)(1) and that it does not beneficially own more than $5 million of Sysco’s shares.
The filing distinguishes this proposal from a 2019 measure that would have required an independent Chair, stating the current request only asks that the Chair not also be the CEO. It cites Sysco’s five-year performance chart from the company’s 2024 10-K showing underperformance versus the S&P 500 and the S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail Index. To support separation, it quotes governance statements from boards where current Sysco directors also serve, describing how split roles can reinforce independent oversight and allow the CEO to focus on management.
Il Comitato per la Responsabilità ha depositato un avviso PX14A6G esortando gli azionisti di Sysco a votare PER l'Articolo 4, che propone una policy per separare i ruoli di Presidente del Consiglio di Amministrazione e CEO. Il presentatore osserva che si tratta di una sottomissione volontaria ai sensi della Regola 14a-6(g)(1) e che non detiene beneficialmente più di 5 milioni di dollari di azioni Sysco.
Il deposito distingue questa proposta da una misura del 2019 che avrebbe richiesto un Presidente indipendente, affermando che l'attuale richiesta chiede solo che il Presidente non sia anche il CEO. Cita inoltre la graduazione quinquennale delle performance di Sysco nel 2024 10-K che mostra una sottoperformance rispetto all'S&P 500 e all'S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail Index. Per supportare la separazione, cita dichiarazioni di governance di consigli di amministrazione in cui anche gli attuali direttori di Sysco ricoprono ruoli, descrivendo come la divisione dei ruoli possa rafforzare la supervisione indipendente e permettere al CEO di concentrarsi sulla gestione.
La Junta de Responsabilidad presentó un aviso PX14A6G instando a los accionistas de Sysco a votar A FAVOR del Artículo 4, que solicita una política para separar los cargos de Presidente de la Junta y CEO. El presentante señala que se trata de una presentación voluntaria conforme a la Regla 14a-6(g)(1) y que no posee de forma beneficiosa más de 5 millones de dólares en acciones de Sysco.
La presentación diferencia esta propuesta de una medida de 2019 que habría requerido un Presidente independiente, indicando que la solicitud actual solo pide que el Presidente no sea también el CEO. Cita el gráfico de desempeño de cinco años de Sysco del 10-K de 2024, que muestra un rendimiento inferior al S&P 500 y al S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail Index. Para respaldar la separación, cita declaraciones de gobernanza de juntas en las que los directores actuales de Sysco también ocupan cargos, describiendo cómo la separación de roles puede reforzar la supervisión independiente y permitir que el CEO se concentre en la gestión.
책임 이사회가 PX14A6G 공시를 제출하여 Sysco 주주들에게 항목 4에 찬성 투표를 촉구했습니다. 이 항목은 이사회 의장과 CEO의 직무를 분리하는 정책을 요구합니다. 제출자는 이것이 규칙 14a-6(g)(1)에 따른 자발적 제출이며 Sysco 주식의 5백만 달러 이상을 실질적으로 소유하고 있지 않다고 명시합니다.
제출서는 2019년 독립 의장을 요구했을 수도 있는 조치와 이 제안이 다르다고 밝히며, 현재의 요청은 의장이 CEO이기도 해서는 안 된다는 것만 요구한다고 밝힙니다. 또한 2024년 연차보고서(10-K)에 포함된 5년 성과 차트를 인용하여 S&P 500 및 S&P 500 식품/필수소매 지수 대비 실적 저조를 보이고 있습니다. 분리를 뒷받침하기 위해 현재 Sysco 이사회 이사들이 겸임하는 거버넌스 진술을 인용하며 직무 분리가 독립적 감독을 강화하고 CEO가 경영에 집중할 수 있게 한다고 설명합니다.
Le Conseil de Responsabilité a déposé un avis PX14A6G exhortant les actionnaires de Sysco à voter POUR l’article 4, qui demande une politique visant à séparer les rôles de Président du conseil et de PDG. Le déposant indique qu’il s’agit d’une soumission volontaire conformément à la Règle 14a-6(g)(1) et qu’il ne détient pas de manière bénéfique plus de 5 millions de dollars d’actions Sysco.
Le dépôt distingue cette proposition d’une mesure de 2019 qui aurait exigé un Président indépendant, indiquant que la demande actuelle ne demande que que le Président ne soit pas aussi le PDG. Il cite le graphique de performance sur cinq ans de Sysco tiré du 2024 10-K de la société montrant une sous-performance par rapport au S&P 500 et à l’indice S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail. Pour soutenir la séparation, il cite des déclarations de gouvernance de conseils où les administrateurs actuels de Sysco exercent également des fonctions, décrivant comment la répartition des rôles peut renforcer la supervision indépendante et permettre au PDG de se concentrer sur la gestion.
Der Accountability Board hat eine PX14A6G-Mitteilung eingereicht, die Sysco-Aktionäre auffordert, für Punkt 4 zu stimmen, der eine Politik zur Trennung der Rollen des Vorsitzenden des Vorstands und des CEO vorsieht. Der Einreicher gibt an, dass dies eine freiwillige Einreichung gemäß Rule 14a-6(g)(1) ist und dass er nicht mehr als 5 Mio. Dollar an Sysco-Aktien besitzt.
Die Einreichung unterscheidet diesen Vorschlag von einer 2019er Maßnahme, die einen unabhängigen Vorsitz gefordert hätte, und erklärt, dass die aktuelle Forderung lediglich verlangt, dass der Vorsitzende nicht gleichzeitig CEO ist. Sie verweist auf das fünf Jahre Leistungsdiagramm von Sysco aus dem Unternehmensbericht 2024 (10-K), das eine Unterperformanz gegenüber dem S&P 500 und dem S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail Index zeigt. Zur Unterstützung der Trennung zitiert sie Governance-Aussagen von Vorständen, in denen auch die aktuellen Direktoren von Sysco Sitze innehaben, und beschreibt, wie eine geteilte Rolle die unabhängige Aufsicht stärken und dem CEO ermöglichen kann, sich auf das Management zu konzentrieren.
مجلس المساءلة قدم إشعار PX14A6G يحث مساهمي Sysco على التصويت لصالح بند 4، الذي يطالب بسياسة لفصل دور رئيس مجلس الإدارة عن دور الرئيس التنفيذي. يذكر المقدم أن هذا التقديم طوعي بموجب القاعدة 14a-6(g)(1) وأنه لا يمتلك بشكل مفيد أكثر من 5 ملايين دولار من أسهم Sysco.
يُميز البلاغ هذا الاقتراح عن إجراء عام 2019 كان من شأنه أن يتطلب رئيساً مستقلاً، مشيراً إلى أن الطلب الحالي يقتصر على أن لا يكون الرئيس أيضاً الرئيس التنفيذي. ويستشهد بمخطط أداء Sysco على مدى خمس سنوات من تقرير 2024 السنوي (10-K) الذي يظهر أداءً دون المستوى مقارنة بمؤشر S&P 500 ومؤشر S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail. لدعم الفصل، يقتبس تصريحات حوكمة من مجالس الإدارة حيث يخدم المدراء الحاليون في Sysco أيضاً، موضحاً كيف يمكن أن يؤدي فصل الأدوار إلى تعزيز الرقابة المستقلة والسماح للرئيس التنفيذي بالتركيز على الإدارة.
问责委员会 提交了 PX14A6G 通知，敦促 Sysco 股东投票支持 第4项，该项要求制定将董事会主席与CEO分离的政策。提交者指出这是根据 规则14a-6(g)(1) 的自愿提交，且其对 Sysco 的股份 Beneficial ownership 不超过 500万美元。
文件将本提案与2019年的一项可能要求独立主席的措施区分开来，表示当前的请求仅要求主席不能同时担任CEO。它引用 Sysco 于2024年12月31日年度报告（10-K）中的五年业绩图表，显示相对于标普500指数和标普500食品/日用品零售指数的落后。为支持分离，它引用董事会治理声明，说明现任Sysco董事也担任董事，描述分离角色如何加强独立监督并使CEO能够专注于管理。/p>
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Insights
Shareholder asks to split Sysco’s Chair and CEO roles.
This PX14A6G advocates a leadership structure where the Board Chair is not the CEO. It contrasts the current request with a 2019 vote on an independent Chair, emphasizing that this proposal focuses on separating roles without mandating independence.
The rationale relies on Sysco’s five-year underperformance referenced from the 2024 10-K and on governance language from other companies’ boards where Sysco directors serve. Outcomes depend on shareholder voting and any subsequent board actions; the filing does not change economics on its own.
Il Comitato per la Responsabilità ha depositato un avviso PX14A6G esortando gli azionisti di Sysco a votare PER l'Articolo 4, che propone una policy per separare i ruoli di Presidente del Consiglio di Amministrazione e CEO. Il presentatore osserva che si tratta di una sottomissione volontaria ai sensi della Regola 14a-6(g)(1) e che non detiene beneficialmente più di 5 milioni di dollari di azioni Sysco.
Il deposito distingue questa proposta da una misura del 2019 che avrebbe richiesto un Presidente indipendente, affermando che l'attuale richiesta chiede solo che il Presidente non sia anche il CEO. Cita inoltre la graduazione quinquennale delle performance di Sysco nel 2024 10-K che mostra una sottoperformance rispetto all'S&P 500 e all'S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail Index. Per supportare la separazione, cita dichiarazioni di governance di consigli di amministrazione in cui anche gli attuali direttori di Sysco ricoprono ruoli, descrivendo come la divisione dei ruoli possa rafforzare la supervisione indipendente e permettere al CEO di concentrarsi sulla gestione.
La Junta de Responsabilidad presentó un aviso PX14A6G instando a los accionistas de Sysco a votar A FAVOR del Artículo 4, que solicita una política para separar los cargos de Presidente de la Junta y CEO. El presentante señala que se trata de una presentación voluntaria conforme a la Regla 14a-6(g)(1) y que no posee de forma beneficiosa más de 5 millones de dólares en acciones de Sysco.
La presentación diferencia esta propuesta de una medida de 2019 que habría requerido un Presidente independiente, indicando que la solicitud actual solo pide que el Presidente no sea también el CEO. Cita el gráfico de desempeño de cinco años de Sysco del 10-K de 2024, que muestra un rendimiento inferior al S&P 500 y al S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail Index. Para respaldar la separación, cita declaraciones de gobernanza de juntas en las que los directores actuales de Sysco también ocupan cargos, describiendo cómo la separación de roles puede reforzar la supervisión independiente y permitir que el CEO se concentre en la gestión.
책임 이사회가 PX14A6G 공시를 제출하여 Sysco 주주들에게 항목 4에 찬성 투표를 촉구했습니다. 이 항목은 이사회 의장과 CEO의 직무를 분리하는 정책을 요구합니다. 제출자는 이것이 규칙 14a-6(g)(1)에 따른 자발적 제출이며 Sysco 주식의 5백만 달러 이상을 실질적으로 소유하고 있지 않다고 명시합니다.
제출서는 2019년 독립 의장을 요구했을 수도 있는 조치와 이 제안이 다르다고 밝히며, 현재의 요청은 의장이 CEO이기도 해서는 안 된다는 것만 요구한다고 밝힙니다. 또한 2024년 연차보고서(10-K)에 포함된 5년 성과 차트를 인용하여 S&P 500 및 S&P 500 식품/필수소매 지수 대비 실적 저조를 보이고 있습니다. 분리를 뒷받침하기 위해 현재 Sysco 이사회 이사들이 겸임하는 거버넌스 진술을 인용하며 직무 분리가 독립적 감독을 강화하고 CEO가 경영에 집중할 수 있게 한다고 설명합니다.
Le Conseil de Responsabilité a déposé un avis PX14A6G exhortant les actionnaires de Sysco à voter POUR l’article 4, qui demande une politique visant à séparer les rôles de Président du conseil et de PDG. Le déposant indique qu’il s’agit d’une soumission volontaire conformément à la Règle 14a-6(g)(1) et qu’il ne détient pas de manière bénéfique plus de 5 millions de dollars d’actions Sysco.
Le dépôt distingue cette proposition d’une mesure de 2019 qui aurait exigé un Président indépendant, indiquant que la demande actuelle ne demande que que le Président ne soit pas aussi le PDG. Il cite le graphique de performance sur cinq ans de Sysco tiré du 2024 10-K de la société montrant une sous-performance par rapport au S&P 500 et à l’indice S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail. Pour soutenir la séparation, il cite des déclarations de gouvernance de conseils où les administrateurs actuels de Sysco exercent également des fonctions, décrivant comment la répartition des rôles peut renforcer la supervision indépendante et permettre au PDG de se concentrer sur la gestion.
Der Accountability Board hat eine PX14A6G-Mitteilung eingereicht, die Sysco-Aktionäre auffordert, für Punkt 4 zu stimmen, der eine Politik zur Trennung der Rollen des Vorsitzenden des Vorstands und des CEO vorsieht. Der Einreicher gibt an, dass dies eine freiwillige Einreichung gemäß Rule 14a-6(g)(1) ist und dass er nicht mehr als 5 Mio. Dollar an Sysco-Aktien besitzt.
Die Einreichung unterscheidet diesen Vorschlag von einer 2019er Maßnahme, die einen unabhängigen Vorsitz gefordert hätte, und erklärt, dass die aktuelle Forderung lediglich verlangt, dass der Vorsitzende nicht gleichzeitig CEO ist. Sie verweist auf das fünf Jahre Leistungsdiagramm von Sysco aus dem Unternehmensbericht 2024 (10-K), das eine Unterperformanz gegenüber dem S&P 500 und dem S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail Index zeigt. Zur Unterstützung der Trennung zitiert sie Governance-Aussagen von Vorständen, in denen auch die aktuellen Direktoren von Sysco Sitze innehaben, und beschreibt, wie eine geteilte Rolle die unabhängige Aufsicht stärken und dem CEO ermöglichen kann, sich auf das Management zu konzentrieren.
United States
Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, DC 20549
Notice of Exempt Solicitation
| 1. | Name of Registrant: |
SYSCO
| 2. | Name of persons relying on exemption: |
THE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD, INC.
| 3. | Addresses of persons relying on exemption: |
401 Edgewater Pl #600, Wakefield, MA 01880
| 4. | Written materials: |
This notice and attached materials amend the filer’s previous submission of October 3, 2025. It includes an additional sentence below that had been inadvertently omitted from the previous cover page.
The attached written materials are submitted pursuant to a voluntary application of Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The filer does not beneficially own more than $5 million of the class of subject securities. As such, submission is not required of this filer under the terms of the Rule but is made in the interest of public disclosure and consideration of these important issues.
Dear fellow shareholders,
Item 4 on Sysco’s proxy statement requests a policy to separate the Board Chair and CEO roles.
Sysco’s opposition statement says stockholders “rejected a proposal requiring an independent Chair in 2019.” Just to be clear, whereas that proposal would’ve required an independent Chair, ours only asks that the Board be Chaired by someone who’s not also the company’s CEO.
Further, the opposition statement says the 2019 proposal was rejected “by an overwhelming majority.” But it’s important to note that Sysco had experienced strong five-year returns going into the 2019 annual meeting. Today, that isn’t the case. Our proposal includes the five-year performance chart from Sysco’s 10-K filed in 2024, showing significant underperformance relative to the S&P 500 and S&P 500 Food/Staple Retail Index.
Clearly, the company’s current leadership structure has not been sufficient to protect shareholder value. Looking ahead, we think shareholders would be better served by a different approach.
To help further explain the benefits of Chair/CEO separation (beyond what’s in our proposal), let’s examine the observations of other companies where Sysco directors were serving.
For instance, with Sysco’s own governance committee Chair, John Hinshaw, on its governance committee, DocuSign said that “separation of the positions of Board Chair and Chief Executive Officer reinforces the independence of the Board in its oversight of the business and affairs of the Company.”
DocuSign also recognized benefits from having an independent chair—benefits we believe arise from separation alone. For example, that it “creates an environment that is more conducive to objective evaluation and oversight of management’s performance, increasing management accountability and improving the ability of the Board to monitor whether management’s actions are in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders” and “enhances the effectiveness of the Board as a whole.”
With Sysco governance committee member Sheila Talton on its Board, Wintrust Financial said “strong corporate governance is a critical component of our success” and listed having an independent Chair as an example of its governance “best practices.” It further explained: “The Board has a non-executive Chairman. This position is independent from management. The Chairman leads the Board meetings as well as meetings of the independent Directors. The CEO is a member of the Board and participates in its meetings. The Board believes that this leadership structure is appropriate for the Company at this time because it allows for independent oversight of management, increases management accountability and encourages an objective evaluation of management’s performance relative to compensation. In addition, the Board recognizes that acting as Chairman of the Board is a particularly time-intensive responsibility. Separating these roles allows the CEO to focus solely on his duties, which the Board believes better serves the Company. Separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO also promotes risk management, enhances the independence of the Board from management, and mitigates potential conflicts of interest between the Board and management.”
With Ali Dibadj on its Board, Janus Henderson touts having an independent Chair—which necessarily means the role has been separated from management—as one of its governance “highlights.” It says this structure “facilitates effective, independent Board oversight of management and the Company’s strategic direction” and that at this time, its current leadership structure “in which the roles of Chair and CEO are separated, effectively enables the Board to carry out its duties.”
With Jill Golder on its Board and governance committee, ABM Industries in 2025 stated of its separation the roles of Chair and CEO that the structure “best serves the Board’s ability to carry out its roles and responsibilities on behalf of ABM’s stockholders, including the Board’s oversight of ABM’s management and ABM’s overall corporate governance.” It further said, “The Board also believes that the current structure allows our Chief Executive Officer to focus on most effectively managing ABM.”
With Bradley Halverson on its Board, Lear Corporation emphasizes under its “corporate governance highlights” that it “maintain[s] separate Chairperson of the Board and CEO roles.” As it further explains, “Our Board has decided to maintain separate Chairperson and CEO roles to allow our CEO to focus on the execution of our business strategy, growth and development, while allowing the Chairperson to lead the Board in its fundamental role of providing advice to, and independent oversight of, management, as well as oversight of Board meetings. The Board recognizes the time, effort and energy that the CEO is required to devote to his position in the current business environment, as well as the commitment required to serve as our Chairperson.”
And with Mr. Halverson on its Board and governance committee, Constellation Energy explained that “Currently, the roles of the Chief Executive Officer and Board Chair are separated. The Board believes that this leadership structure ensures independent oversight and promotes the Board’s ability to effectively represent the best interests of all shareholders.”
To be clear, we’re not suggesting these companies have policies requiring Chair and CEO separation; but importantly, they all made the decision to separate the roles anyway. We share their statements here because they are examples of Boards with Sysco’s own directors on them clearly espousing the benefits of having two different people serve as Chair and CEO. Especially considering Sysco’s substantial financial underperformance (as charted in the proposal), we think these are benefits our shareholders should also be able to enjoy. Thank you for your consideration.
We’re not asking for and can’t accept your proxy. Please vote “FOR” Item 4.
