Acurx (ACXP) proxy: vote on 20% dilution, 50M new shares, cash runway boost
Acurx Pharmaceuticals’ September 16, 2025 virtual special meeting asks holders to approve three items:(1) under Nasdaq Rule 5635(d) the potential issuance of up to 133,363 new shares (≥20% of current float) upon exercise of Series G-2 warrants created in a June 17, 2025 warrant-inducement financing;(2) an amendment increasing authorized common shares to 250 million from 200 million; and(3) authority to adjourn the meeting if needed.
The June financing exchanged 222,272 previously outstanding warrants (cash-exercised at $12.00) for (i) 311,180 Series G-1 and (ii) 133,363 Series G-2 warrants, both exercisable at $8.50. The transaction delivered $2.67 million gross proceeds and could yield a further ≈$1.1 million if the G-2 warrants are cash-exercised after shareholder approval. A one-for-20 reverse split became effective August 4, 2025, shrinking outstanding shares to 1,526,227 as of the July 21 record date.
Failure to approve Proposal 1 renders the G-2 warrants non-exercisable and obligates the board to hold successive 90-day meetings until approval, while also forfeiting potential proceeds. Proposal 2 is framed as providing capital-raising flexibility; current fully diluted commitments leave ~197 million authorized shares unused. Management and directors own 20.3% of shares; Armistice Capital is the only 5%+ holder at 24.6%. Cash on hand was $4.6 million at March 31 2025.
Positive
- $2.67 million cash already raised, improving near-term liquidity
- Potential $1.1 million additional proceeds if Series G-2 warrants exercised
- Reverse split and reduced float may enhance Nasdaq compliance
- Share authorization increase offers financing flexibility without repeated filings
Negative
- Series G-2 and future issuances could cause significant dilution (>20% threshold)
- Authorized share rise to 250 million signals more potential dilution
- Reverse split often precedes weak price performance
- Mandatory 90-day re-votes add cost and distraction if approval fails
Insights
TL;DR: Vote enables dilution-heavy financing that extends cash runway but caps upside; neutrality hinges on liquidity needs.
Issuing up to 133k new shares (≈8.7% post-split) plus a 50 million share authorization boost is materially dilutive yet supplies ~$1.1 m potential cash atop June’s $2.67 m. For a micro-cap with $4.6 m cash, 12-18 months of runway and ongoing R&D, the warrants offer inexpensive non-debt capital. However, pricing below market/book and expanded share capacity signal more raises ahead, pressuring valuation. Impact: balanced—needed liquidity offsets dilution risk.
TL;DR: Proposals increase board flexibility but weaken shareholder power via dilution and anti-takeover effects.
Raising authorized shares to 250 m grants management latitude for future deals without further votes, reducing transactional frictions but also lowering existing holders’ voting percentage and potentially deterring hostile bids. Mandatory repeated meetings if Proposal 1 fails create governance cost pressure. Beneficial-ownership limits (4.99/9.99%) mitigate change-of-control risk but entrench current leadership. Net governance impact is mixed; transparency adequate, protection limited.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. )
259 Liberty Avenue,
Staten Island, NY 10305
President & Chief Executive Officer
259 Liberty Avenue,
Staten Island, NY 10305
DATE: September 16, 2025
PLACE: Virtually at www.virtualshareholdermeeting.com/ACXP2025SM.
President & Chief Executive Officer
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PAGE
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IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE SPECIAL MEETING AND VOTING
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| | | | 3 | | |
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SECURITY OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN BENEFICIAL OWNERS AND MANAGEMENT
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PROPOSAL NO. 1 ISSUANCE PROPOSAL
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PROPOSAL NO. 2 AUTHORIZED SHARE INCREASE PROPOSAL
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PROPOSAL NO. 3 ADJOURNMENT PROPOSAL
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OTHER MATTERS
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STOCKHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS
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| Appendix | | | | | | | |
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Appendix A
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| | | | A-1 | | |
259 Liberty Avenue,
Staten Island, NY 10305
SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
STOCKHOLDER MEETING TO BE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
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Proposal 1: Approve the Issuance Proposal
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| | The affirmative vote of a majority of the shares cast affirmatively or negatively for this proposal is required to approve the Issuance Proposal. Abstentions will have no effect on the results of this vote. Brokerage firms do not have authority to vote customers’ unvoted shares held by the firms in street name on this proposal. As a result, any shares not voted by a customer will be treated as a broker non-vote. Such broker non-votes will have no effect on the results of this vote. | |
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Proposal 2: Approve the Authorized Share Increase Proposal
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| | The affirmative vote of a majority of the shares cast affirmatively or negatively for this proposal is required to approve the Share Increase Proposal. Abstentions will have no effect on the results of this vote. Brokerage firms do not have authority to vote customers’ unvoted shares held by the firms in street name on this proposal. As a result, any shares not voted by a customer will be treated as a broker non-vote. Such broker non-votes will have no effect on the results of this vote. | |
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Proposal 3: Approve the Adjournment Proposal
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| | The affirmative vote of a majority of the shares cast affirmatively or negatively for this proposal is required to approve the adjournment of the special meeting to a later date or dates, if necessary or appropriate, to solicit additional proxies if there are insufficient votes to adopt either of the Issuance Proposal or the Authorized Share Increase Proposal, or to establish a quorum. Brokerage firms have authority to vote customers’ unvoted shares held by the firms in street name on this proposal. Broker non-votes (if any) for such shares (if deemed present or represented by proxy at the special meeting pursuant to Delaware law) will be treated as votes against this proposal. | |
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Shares Beneficially Owned
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Name of Beneficial Owner
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Number
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Percent
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| Directors and Named Executive Officers: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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David P. Luci(1)
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| | | | 128,865 | | | | | | 8.0% | | |
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Robert G. Shawah(2)
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| | | | 37,322 | | | | | | 2.4% | | |
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Robert J. DeLuccia(3)
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| | | | 122,544 | | | | | | 7.6% | | |
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Joseph C. Scodari(4)
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| | | | 6,217 | | | | | | * | | |
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Jack H. Dean(5)
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| | | | 5,720 | | | | | | * | | |
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Thomas Harrison(6)
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| | | | 3,677 | | | | | | * | | |
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Carl Sailer(7)
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| | | | 13,761 | | | | | | * | | |
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James Donohue(8)
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| | | | 5,523 | | | | | | * | | |
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All current directors and executive officers as a group (8 persons)
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| | | | 323,629 | | | | | | 20.3% | | |
| 5% Stockholders | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Armistice Capital, LLC(9)
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| | | | 455,654 | | | | | | 24.6% | | |
August 4, 2025