[PRE 14A] Acurx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Preliminary Proxy Statement
Acurx Pharmaceuticals (ACXP) will hold a virtual special meeting on 16 Sep 2025 to vote on three proposals:
- Issuance Proposal: approve, under Nasdaq Rule 5635(d), up to 2,667,261 new shares issuable on exercise of Series G-2 warrants granted in a 17 Jun 2025 inducement financing. The warrants cannot be exercised—and would be worthless—without this approval.
- Authorized Share Increase: amend the Certificate of Incorporation to raise authorized common stock to 250 MM from 200 MM, providing flexibility for future corporate actions.
- Adjournment Proposal: permit adjournment if extra time is needed to secure votes or a quorum.
The June financing generated $2.67 MM gross proceeds when an investor exercised 4.45 MM existing warrants at $0.60. In exchange, Acurx issued 6.22 MM Series G-1 and 2.67 MM Series G-2 warrants, each exercisable at $0.425 for five years after shareholder approval. Full G-2 cash exercise could add ≈$1.1 MM more.
As of 23 Jul 2025, Acurx had 30.76 MM shares outstanding and ≈$4.6 MM cash (31 Mar 2025). Board recommends voting FOR all proposals, citing capital needs and strategic flexibility. Failure to approve would block warrant exercise, forfeit potential cash proceeds, and oblige Acurx to keep calling meetings every 90 days until approval or warrant expiry.
- None.
- None.
Insights
TL;DR: Vote expands liquidity but dilutes holders; overall neutral-to-slightly positive.
The June inducement raised $2.67 MM immediately—vital given 31 Mar cash of only $4.6 MM. Authorizing another 2.67 MM shares via G-2 warrants could add $1.1 MM if exercised for cash, extending runway for clinical programs without traditional equity sale. However, existing investors face ~8.7% potential dilution (2.67 MM ÷ 30.76 MM). Raising the authorized share cap by 50 MM further signals ongoing capital needs and may pre-empt future dilutive financings. Because G-2 cannot be exercised without approval, rejecting Proposal 1 sacrifices financing and prolongs proxy costs. Net effect: modest liquidity upside outweighs manageable dilution; impact rated neutral as neither transformational nor severely adverse.
TL;DR: Proposals provide flexibility but weaken shareholder influence; moderate governance risk.
Increasing authorized shares to 250 MM gives management a 5× buffer over current outstanding shares, enabling quick capital raises or strategic issuances without further votes—as Delaware law allows once amendment passes. Combined with warrants priced below market and a 4.99–9.99% ownership cap, dilution is distributed yet still material. Repeated special meetings every 90 days if Proposal 1 fails would divert resources; thus adjournment authority reduces that risk. No change-of-control protection triggers, but larger share pool may act as a deterrent to hostile bids. Overall, governance trade-off is acceptable in light of company’s funding needs but should be monitored.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. )
259 Liberty Avenue,
Staten Island, NY 10305
President & Chief Executive Officer
259 Liberty Avenue,
Staten Island, NY 10305
DATE: September 16, 2025
PLACE: Virtually at www.virtualshareholdermeeting.com/ACXP2025SM.
President & Chief Executive Officer
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PAGE
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IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE SPECIAL MEETING AND VOTING
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| | | | 3 | | |
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SECURITY OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN BENEFICIAL OWNERS AND MANAGEMENT
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| | | | 9 | | |
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PROPOSAL NO. 1 ISSUANCE PROPOSAL
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| | | | 11 | | |
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PROPOSAL NO. 2 AUTHORIZED SHARE INCREASE PROPOSAL
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PROPOSAL NO. 3 ADJOURNMENT PROPOSAL
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OTHER MATTERS
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| | | | 16 | | |
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STOCKHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS
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| | | | 16 | | |
| Appendix | | | | | | | |
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Appendix A
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| | | | A-1 | | |
259 Liberty Avenue,
Staten Island, NY 10305
SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
STOCKHOLDER MEETING TO BE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
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Proposal 1: Approve the Issuance Proposal
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| | The affirmative vote of a majority of the shares cast affirmatively or negatively for this proposal is required to approve the Issuance Proposal. Abstentions will have no effect on the results of this vote. Brokerage firms do not have authority to vote customers’ unvoted shares held by the firms in street name on this proposal. As a result, any shares not voted by a customer will be treated as a broker non-vote. Such broker non-votes will have no effect on the results of this vote. | |
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Proposal 2: Approve the Authorized Share Increase Proposal
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| | The affirmative vote of a majority of the shares cast affirmatively or negatively for this proposal is required to approve the Share Increase Proposal. Abstentions will have no effect on the results of this vote. Brokerage firms do not have authority to vote customers’ unvoted shares held by the firms in street name on this proposal. As a result, any shares not voted by a customer will be treated as a broker non-vote. Such broker non-votes will have no effect on the results of this vote. | |
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Proposal 3: Approve the Adjournment Proposal
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| | The affirmative vote of a majority of the shares cast affirmatively or negatively for this proposal is required to approve the adjournment of the special meeting to a later date or dates, if necessary or appropriate, to solicit additional proxies if there are insufficient votes to adopt either of the Issuance Proposal or the Authorized Share Increase Proposal, or to establish a quorum. Brokerage firms have authority to vote customers’ unvoted shares held by the firms in street name on this proposal. Broker non-votes (if any) for such shares (if deemed present or represented by proxy at the special meeting pursuant to Delaware law) will be treated as votes against this proposal. | |
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Shares Beneficially Owned
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Name of Beneficial Owner
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Number
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Percent
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| Directors and Named Executive Officers: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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David P. Luci(1)
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| | | | 2,577,303 | | | | | | 8.0% | | |
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Robert G. Shawah(2)
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| | | | 746,436 | | | | | | 2.4% | | |
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Robert J. DeLuccia(3)
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| | | | 2,450,889 | | | | | | 7.6% | | |
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Joseph C. Scodari(4)
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| | | | 124,339 | | | | | | * | | |
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Jack H. Dean(5)
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| | | | 114,398 | | | | | | * | | |
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Thomas Harrison(6)
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| | | | 73,539 | | | | | | * | | |
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Carl Sailer(7)
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| | | | 275,218 | | | | | | * | | |
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James Donohue(8)
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| | | | 110,454 | | | | | | * | | |
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All current directors and executive officers as a group (8 persons)
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| | | | 6,472,576 | | | | | | 20.3% | | |
| 5% Stockholders | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Armistice Capital, LLC(9)
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| | | | 9,113,084 | | | | | | 24.6% | | |
July , 2025