As the Founder and the largest active investor in lululemon, I care deeply about this business. My passion
for lululemon is grounded in a deep understanding of the brand’s origin, an undeniably unique long-term perspective on its competitive positioning and a conviction that lululemon’s best years remain ahead. I genuinely believe lululemon
can be fixed, but without the right change made to the Board, further value destruction is inevitable.
I am seeking your support in my campaign for this
change. For the reasons stated below, I urge you to vote “FOR” my three independent, highly-qualified nominees to be elected to the Board at the Company’s 2026 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (the “Annual
Meeting”), which I have the strongest belief will help restore lululemon’s once bold vision and product-centered brand.
lululemon is in
Trouble Because it Has Lost Focus
What is most troubling about the crisis at lululemon is that it was entirely avoidable if the Board had the right
expertise to oversee the business.
To understand how we got here, we must understand where lululemon started. The core values of the lululemon brand have
always been its premium positioning and commitment to the muse: the woman who inspires culture, not just follows it. This drove consumer passion, leading to sales growth, margin power, a competitive moat and, ultimately, a premium share price.
Several years ago, the Company began making decisions that would, seemingly intentionally, unwind this premium position through “brand
harvesting.” These types of decisions can create a “sugar high” of sorts in financial reporting, but, in the long-run, they erode the brand’s
high-end reputation. It appeared, and continues to appear, that the Board was dead-set on lululemon becoming another of the countless examples of fashion brands that
have failed to manage their quality and market position with consumers and destroyed a once thriving business.
lululemon’s brand harvesting is
probably best exemplified by its partnership with The Walt Disney Company (“Disney”). Disney is a mass-market brand that is not at all aligned with the lululemon brand, nor does Disney target the same demographics as lululemon. Most
importantly, this collaboration drove away inspiring customers, inspiring designers and inspiring store employees. lululemon is now left with outlying customers who follow generic athletic brands. This
ill-advised partnership was a blatant move to grab short-term revenue growth through channel expansion. Unfortunately, but predictably, it was at the expense of signaling that lululemon was no longer the
leading, premium, cool brand initially personified by its muse. Randal Konik, an analyst from Jefferies Financial Group, reported it perfectly, “While we understand how the Disney collaboration occurred (the LULU CEO is also on the Disney
board), we don’t understand how this collaboration fits into the LULU brand at all.”1
The Disney partnership is not the only evidence of brand-drift. Shareholders can also see the degradation of lululemon’s premium brand positioning in
the Company’s many failed new product ventures. The unveiling of footwear. The Selfcare beauty line. Smaller accessories and Disney-themed trinkets. All of these were chasing the coattails of trends well after their lifecycles ended. They were
poorly executed through flawed decision-making and weak product planning. The Company has also resorted to promotional credit card discounts, essentially paying customers to shop its products and further eroding the brand’s premium position.
Each of these strategic decisions by the Board has drawn the brand away from what originally attracted the core customer to lululemon.
It is clear to
those who understand creative, premium businesses that technocratic MBAs have taken control of lululemon, and the business has suffered ever since.
The Loss of Focus is Destroying Significant Value
The
Board’s endorsement of brand-eroding choices has led to a 65.9%2 loss in shareholder value over a less than two-year period. This makes lululemon one
of the worst-performing stocks among its peers, lagging its peer median on one- and three-year total shareholder returns by 19.5% and 63.6% respectively.3
Over the past five years, the Board has watched approximately $17 billion in shareholder value disappear.4