Virtu Financial plans Texas move after approvals
VIRT's internal corporate affairs would shift to Texas law, while outstanding shares and equity awards would continue in corresponding classes and terms.
Sentiment and the balance of points
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Virtu Financial, Inc. (VIRT) received board approval and majority-holder written consent for a proposed conversion from Delaware to Texas. Its board unanimously approved the plan on November 4, 2026, and TJMT Holdings LLC, which held a majority of voting power, approved it by written consent that day. Virtu plans to effect the conversion no earlier than 20 calendar days after mailing of the information statement begins; it is not asking stockholders to submit a proxy.
At the effective time, each outstanding Class A, B, C and D share would convert into one corresponding Texas share; certificates need not be exchanged. Outstanding awards and instruments would continue for corresponding securities, with existing terms preserved to the extent permitted by law and reasonably practicable. Virtu says the transaction will not change its business, jobs, management, properties, employee count, assets, liabilities or net worth, except for transaction costs. Texas law and the Texas charter and bylaws would govern internal affairs. The charter requires at least 3% beneficial ownership to bring derivative proceedings against directors or officers in their official capacities and waives jury trials for internal entity claims. Texas law provides books-and-records inspection rights if a shareholder holds at least 5% or has held shares for at least six months. Virtu paid approximately $250,000 in Delaware franchise tax for the most recent period and does not expect its Texas franchise tax to materially increase solely due to the reincorporation.
Positive
- None.
Negative
- Minor point. Forward-looking: it has not happened yet and may not happen.The Texas charter sets a 3% ownership threshold for derivative proceedings against directors or officers.
Filing Explained
The approved but not yet effective conversion would place Virtu under a Texas charter that presumes directors and officers acted in good faith, on an informed basis and in the company’s interests, and a claim against a director or officer would require rebutting that presumption and proving fraud, intentional misconduct, an ultra vires act or a knowing violation of law.
Key Figures
Key Terms
Plan of Conversion regulatory
written consent regulatory
appraisal rights regulatory
internal entity claim regulatory
FAQ
AI-generated questions and answers. How Rhea-AI works. Not financial advice.
What happens to VIRT shares if the Texas reincorporation takes effect?
Can VIRT Class B, Class C and Class D shareholders seek appraisal?
What VIRT shareholder rights would change under the Texas charter?
AI-generated analysis. How Rhea-AI works. Not financial advice.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
REQUESTED NOT TO SEND US A PROXY
Director and Chief Executive Officer
, 2026
1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
AND YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO SEND US A PROXY
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Delaware
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Texas
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Classes of Stock
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The Delaware Charter provides for the following classes of stock:
Class A common stock. 1 vote per share. 1 share of economics per share.
Class B common stock. 10 votes per share. 1 share of economics per share.
Class C common stock. 1 vote per share. No economic rights (including rights to dividends and distributions upon liquidation).
Class D common stock. 10 votes per share. No economic rights (including rights to dividends and distributions upon liquidation).
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The Texas Charter provides for the same classes of stock as the Delaware Charter:
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Acts Requiring Stockholder Approval
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Generally. Under the DGCL, approval of a majority of the voting power of outstanding shares is required to approve certain matters, including certain fundamental business transactions and amendments to the certificate of incorporation, unless the charter specifies a higher voting threshold.
Certain Charter or By-law Amendments. Prior to the Triggering Event, amendments to specified provisions of the Delaware Charter providing for the classified board, vacancies and newly created directorships, removal of directors, stockholder action by written consent, special meetings of stockholders, business combinations with interested stockholders, corporate opportunities, amendments to the By-laws, amendments to the Charter and exclusive forum for disputes, or the adoption of any Charter or By-law provisions inconsistent with those provisions, require approval by (i) prior to the Triggering Event, a majority of the total voting power of the outstanding shares; and (ii) from and after the Triggering Event, 75% of the outstanding voting power.
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Generally. Under the TBOC, approval of two-thirds of the voting power of outstanding shares is required to approve certain matters, including “fundamental business transactions” such as mergers, sales of substantially all assets, and other transactions, unless the charter specifies a lower voting threshold. To align with the current rights of shareholders, the Texas Charter provides that to the maximum extent permitted by the TBOC, but except as otherwise set forth in the Texas Charter, the vote of shareholders holding a majority of the voting power of the outstanding shares shall be sufficient to approve any action requiring shareholder approval, including any “fundamental business transaction” and “fundamental action” as defined in the TBOC.
Certain Charter or By-law Amendments. The Texas Charter contains the same stockholder approval requirements for charter amendments as the Delaware Charter.
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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Classified Board
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The Delaware Charter provides that the Board is divided into three classes, with each class holding three-year terms.
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The Texas Charter provides for the same classified board structure as the Delaware Charter.
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Stockholder Action by Written Consent
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The Delaware Charter provides that (i) prior to the Triggering Event, stockholders can act by written consent if taken by a majority of the total voting power; and (ii) after the Triggering Event, stockholders cannot act by written consent.
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The Texas Charter provides that (i) prior to the Triggering Event, stockholders can act by written consent if taken by a majority of the total voting power, and (ii) after the Triggering Event, shareholders can act by written consent only if taken by all shareholders. (The TBOC requires shareholders to have the option to act by written consent in lieu of a meeting, if consent is unanimous.)
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Calling of Special Stockholder Meetings
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The Delaware Charter provides that special stockholder meetings may be called only by or at the direction of:
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the Board acting by a majority of the total number of directors if there were no vacancies;
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the Chairman;
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the Vice Chairman; or
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the Chief Executive Officer.
In addition, the Delaware Charter provides that, prior to the Triggering Event, special meetings may be called by the Secretary at the request of holders of a majority of the total voting power of the outstanding shares entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, voting together as a single class.
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The Texas Charter provides that special shareholder meetings may be called only by or at the direction of:
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the Board acting by a majority of the total number of directors if there were no vacancies;
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the Chairman;
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the Vice Chairman;
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the Chief Executive Officer or President; or
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the Secretary at the request of the holders of not less than 50% of the total voting power of outstanding shares. (The TBOC requires that shareholders have the right to call a special meeting, with threshold not to exceed 50%.)
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Filling Board Vacancies
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The Delaware Charter provides that any newly created directorships resulting from any increase in the number of authorized directors or any vacancies resulting from death, resignation, retirement, disqualification, removal from office or other cause shall be filled by a majority of the directors remaining in office, even if less than a quorum, or, prior to the Triggering Event, by holders of a majority of the outstanding voting power entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, voting together as a single class.
Any director elected to fill a vacancy holds office until the next election of the class for which such director shall have been chosen and until his or her
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The Texas Charter provides that director vacancies may be filled in any manner permitted by the TBOC, including (i) by election at an annual or special meeting of shareholders called for that purpose, or (ii) by the affirmative vote of the majority of the remaining directors, even if the remaining directors constitute less than a quorum of the board.
Any director chosen to fill a vacancy will hold office for the remainder of the unexpired term of such director’s predecessor or until such director’s earlier death, disqualification, resignation or removal, except that, in accordance with the TBOC, directors appointed to fill vacancies resulting from an increase in the number of
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Delaware
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Texas
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successor shall be duly elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier death, disqualification, resignation or removal.
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directors shall serve only until the next election of one or more directors by shareholders at an annual or special meeting called for that purpose.
The Texas Charter also provides that if a director is appointed by the board to fill a vacancy created by the increase in the number of directors and the director was assigned to a class of the board that is not otherwise up for re-election at the next annual or special meeting of shareholders, then at such shareholders’ meeting the director may be included in the slate of nominees for election as directors at such meeting to serve for the remaining term associated with the class to which the director was assigned by the board.
Additionally, in accordance with the TBOC, the Texas Charter prevents the board from filling more than two vacancies resulting from an increase in the size of the board of directors during a period between two successive annual meetings of shareholders.
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Jury Trial Waiver
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The Delaware Charter does not include a waiver of the right to jury trials. However, suits before the Delaware Court of Chancery are bench trials (not jury trials).
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Under the TBOC, a corporation may include a waiver of the right to a jury trial in its governing documents concerning any internal entity claim.
The Texas Charter includes a waiver of the right to jury trials concerning any “internal entity claim” (as defined in the TBOC).
Prior to the Triggering Event, amendments to or repeal of this new provision require approval by holders of a majority of the total voting power entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, voting together as a single class. From and after the Triggering Event, an amendment to this provision requires approval by holders of 75% of the outstanding voting power.
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Exclusive Forum
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The Delaware Charter provides that unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware is the sole and exclusive forum for (i) derivative claims, (ii) claims for breach of fiduciary duty, (iii) claims under the DGCL or (iv) any claims against the Corporation governed by the internal affairs
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The Texas Charter provides that unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Business Court in the Third Business Court Division of the State of Texas (Austin) (provided that if such court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas — Austin or, if such court lacks jurisdiction, the
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Delaware
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Texas
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state district court of Texas situated in Travis County) is the sole and exclusive forum for (i) derivative claims, (ii) claims for breach of fiduciary duty, (iii) claims under the TBOC, Texas Charter or By-laws or (iv) any claims against the Corporation governed by the internal affairs doctrine.
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Ownership Threshold for Derivative Proceedings
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The DGCL does not expressly authorize any minimum ownership requirement for stockholders to bring derivative suits.
The Delaware Charter does not include an ownership threshold for bringing derivative proceedings.
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The TBOC allows corporations with common shares listed on a national securities exchange to impose a minimum ownership requirement for shareholders to bring derivative suits (up to 3% of the corporation’s issued and outstanding shares).
The Texas Charter provides that a shareholder or group of shareholders desiring to bring a derivative proceeding against any director and/or officer in his or her official capacity must beneficially own at least 3% of the total outstanding shares.
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Director and Officer Liability
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To the fullest extent permitted by the DGCL, no director or officer shall be personally liable to the Corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer to the Corporation. Delaware law provides for certain exceptions to this limitation of liability for breach of duty of loyalty, bad faith, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of law, improper personal benefit, and claims brought by or on behalf of the corporation against an officer.
The Delaware Charter eliminates the personal liability of the Corporation’s directors and officers to the Corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for any breach of fiduciary duties as a director or officer, to the fullest extent permitted by the DGCL as now in effect or as it may be amended in the future.
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To the fullest extent permitted by the TBOC, no director or officer shall be personally liable to the Corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer to the Corporation. Texas law provides for certain exceptions to this limitation of liability for breach of duty of loyalty, bad faith, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of law, and improper personal benefit. The Corporation affirmatively elects to be governed by Section 21.419 of the TBOC, which codifies the deferential business judgment rule for corporate directors and officers. The Section presumes that directors and officers have acted in good faith, on an informed basis, in furtherance of the interests of the corporation and in obedience to the law, and provides that neither the corporation nor any of its shareholders has a cause of action against a director or officer as a result of any act or omission in the person’s capacity as a director or officer unless (a) the claimant rebuts one or more of the codified presumptions and (b) it is proven by the claimant that (i) the director’s or officer’s act or omission constituted a breach of the person’s
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Delaware
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Texas
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duties as a director or officer and (ii) the breach involved fraud, intentional misconduct, an ultra vires act or a knowing violation of law.
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Advancement of Expenses
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The Delaware Charter provides that as a condition to the advancement of expenses, if the DGCL then so requires, the Covered Person (as defined in the Delaware Charter) must deliver to the Corporation an undertaking to repay such amounts if it shall ultimately be determined that such Covered Person is not entitled to be indemnified.
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The TBOC requires that a Covered Person deliver to the Corporation in writing the undertaking required by the Delaware Charter, as well as a written affirmation by the Covered Person of his or her good-faith belief that he or she is entitled to indemnification for funds to be advanced.
Accordingly, the Texas Charter requires the Covered Person to provide, in addition to the undertaking, in writing, required by the Delaware Charter, the written affirmation described above.
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Waiver of Corporate Opportunity
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The Delaware Charter provides that the Corporation waives, to the maximum extent permitted by law, the application of the doctrine of corporate opportunity with respect to the Corporation, to the principal stockholders (i.e., the Viola Entities, Silver Lake Entities and the Temasek Entities as defined in the Delaware Charter), any directors or any of their affiliates; provided that the waiver shall not apply to directors (other than Vincent Viola) that are officers of the Corporation and/or any of its subsidiaries.
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The Texas Charter provides that the Corporation waives, to the maximum extent permitted by law, the application of the doctrine of corporate opportunity with respect to the Corporation, to the principal stockholders (i.e., the Viola Entities, Silver Lake Entities and the Temasek Entities as defined in the Texas Charter), any directors or any of their affiliates; provided that the waiver shall not apply to directors (other than Vincent Viola and Michael Viola) that are officers of the Corporation and/or any of its subsidiaries.
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Certain Business Combinations
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The Corporation opts out of DGCL Section 203, Delaware’s business combination statute. The Delaware Charter, however, includes its own business combination provision, which provides that the Corporation shall not engage in any “business combination” with an “interested stockholder” for three years following the time that such stockholder became an interested stockholder, unless:
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prior to such time, the Board approved either the business combination or the transaction which resulted in the stockholder becoming an interested stockholder;
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upon consummation of the transaction which resulted in the stockholder becoming an interested stockholder, the interested stockholder owned at least 85% of
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The Corporation opts out of TBOC Section 21.606, Texas’s business combination statute. The Texas Charter contains its own business combination provision that substantially matches the one in the current Delaware Charter.
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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the voting stock of the Corporation at the time the transaction commenced, excluding for purposes of determining the voting stock outstanding (but not the outstanding voting stock owned by the interested stockholder) those shares owned by (i) persons who are directors and also officers or (ii) employee stock plans in which employee participants do not have the right to determine confidentially whether shares held subject to the plan will be tendered in a tender or exchange offer; or
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at or subsequent to such time, the business combination is approved by the Board and authorized by at least two-thirds of the outstanding voting stock not owned by the interested stockholder.
For purposes of this provision, “business combination” includes:
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any merger or consolidation of the Corporation or any of its majority-owned subsidiaries with the interested stockholder,
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any sale, lease, transfer or other disposition, except proportionately as a shareholder of the Corporation, to or with the interested stockholder, of assets of the Corporation or its majority-owned subsidiaries, which assets have an aggregate market value equal to 10% or more of either the aggregate market value of all the assets of the Corporation determined on a consolidated basis or the aggregate market value of all the outstanding stock of the Corporation;
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any transaction which results in the issuance or transfer by the Corporation or by any of its majority-owned subsidiaries of stock of the Corporation or such subsidiary to the interested stockholder, subject to certain exceptions;
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any transaction involving the Corporation or any of its majority-owned subsidiaries which has the effect of increasing the proportionate share of the stock of any class or
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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series of the Corporation or of such subsidiary which is owned by the interested stockholder (subject to certain exceptions); or
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any receipt by the interested stockholder of the benefit (except proportionately as a shareholder of the Corporation), of any loans, advances, guarantees, pledges, or other financial benefits provided by or through the Corporation or any of its majority-owned subsidiaries.
For purposes of this provision, an “interested stockholder” means any person (other than the Corporation or any of its majority-owned subsidiaries) that (i) is the owner of 15% or more of the outstanding voting stock of the Corporation, or (ii) is an affiliate or associate of the Corporation and was the owner of 15% or more of the outstanding voting stock of the Corporation at any time within the three-year period immediately prior to the date on which it is sought to be determined whether such person is an interested stockholder, and the affiliates and associates of such person; provided that “interested stockholder” shall not include:
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Mr. Vincent Viola, TJMT Holdings LLC and any of their respective successors and affiliates;
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any investment funds managed, sponsored, controlled or advised by Silver Lake Group L.L.C. and their respective successors and affiliates;
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certain entities related to Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited;
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any person (a “Principal Shareholder transferee”) who acquires voting stock of the Corporation from one of the foregoing persons (other than in connection with a public offering) and who is designated as a Principal Shareholder transferee by such foregoing person;
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any person whose ownership of shares in excess of the 15% limitation is the result of any action taken solely by the Corporation.
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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Fiduciary Duties
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In Delaware, fiduciary duties are generally developed by case law.
In general, directors and officers owe the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty (which further include the duties of good faith, oversight, and disclosure) to the corporation and its stockholders.
The duty of care requires directors not to act with gross negligence, including, depending on the facts and circumstances, by being well-informed and considering reasonably available relevant information.
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act in good faith and under the belief that their actions will be best for the corporation and its stockholders.
Directors are “fully protected” if they rely in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such other person’s professional or expert competence and who has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.
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In Texas, fiduciary duties are generally developed by case law.
Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care, and obedience (i.e., duty to follow the law and the governing agreements of the corporation) to the corporation.
A director may rely (unless the director knows reliance is unwarranted) in good faith and with ordinary care on information, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, prepared or presented by an officer or employee of the entity, legal counsel, a certified public accountant, an investment banker, a person who the director reasonably believes possesses professional expertise in the matter, or a committee of the corporation on which the director does not serve.
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Business Judgment Rule
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Under Delaware law, directors and officers are generally protected by the business judgment rule, which is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
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Under Texas law, directors and officers are generally protected by the business judgment rule, which protects directors and officers from liability for decisions that may be considered negligent or unwise if made in good faith and within their discretion in furtherance of the corporation’s interests. In particular, a
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Delaware
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the company. Under the business judgment rule, a court will generally not second-guess directors’ decisions unless the business judgment rule’s presumptions have been rebutted for a majority of directors who made the challenged decision. If the business judgment rule’s presumptions have been rebutted for a majority of directors, directors will not be personally liable absent a finding of non-exculpated fiduciary misconduct. Personal liability for breach of the duty of care cannot occur unless (i) the director acted with gross negligence and (ii) the certificate of incorporation lacks an applicable exculpation provision.
The Delaware Charter has an exculpation provision which forecloses personal liability for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director.
Delaware courts apply enhanced scrutiny in certain scenarios involving the adoption of defensive measures, certain change of control transactions, and certain scenarios involving interference with stockholders’ voting rights. If enhanced scrutiny applies, the court generally reviews directors’ actions for reasonableness. Delaware courts apply the entire fairness standard of review where either (i) a majority of directors who made the challenged decision were interested or lacked independence or (ii) the transaction involved a conflicted controlling stockholder. Under the entire fairness standard, the burden is generally on the defendant fiduciaries to demonstrate that the act or transaction was a product of fair dealing and resulted in a fair price. However, the DGCL provides that if a statutory safe harbor applies, the act or transaction cannot be the subject of equitable relief or give rise to an award of money damages against directors, officers, or controlling stockholders.
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corporation with a series or class of stock listed on a national securities exchange or one which has opted in is protected by a codified business judgment rule which establishes a presumption that directors and officers, in deciding upon matters of business, are presumed to act in good faith, on an informed basis, in furtherance of the interests of the corporation, and in obedience to the law and the corporation’s governing law. This presumption governs director and officer liability in all matters of the corporation’s business (including transactions with interested persons), and neither the corporation nor any shareholder has a claim against a director or officer unless they (a) rebut the presumption and (b) prove an act or omission that both (i) is a breach of a duty and (ii) constitutes intentional misconduct, fraud, an ultra vires act or a knowing violation of law. It further requires that the claimant plead with particularity the circumstances constituting the intentional misconduct, fraud, ultra vires act, or knowing violation of law. By requiring intentional misconduct, Texas law prevents a claim of breach of duty arising out of negligence or gross negligence.
In addition, the Texas Charter has an exculpation provision which forecloses personal liability for duty of care breaches.
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Controlling Stockholder Matters
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Fiduciary Duties. Under Delaware law, controlling stockholders of a corporation may owe fiduciary duties to
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Fiduciary Duties. Texas case law has not defined the concept of a “controlling shareholder” in a publicly
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Delaware
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the corporation and its minority stockholders in certain circumstances, including when engaging in conflict transactions or when the controlling stockholder is selling its shares or seeking to change the status quo using its voting power. However, the recent amendments to the DGCL provide that controlling stockholders and control groups, in their capacity as such, cannot be liable for monetary damages for breach of the duty of care.
Controlling Stockholder Transactions. Section 144 of the DGCL provides safe harbor procedures for acts or transactions in which one or more directors or officers as well as controlling stockholders and members of control groups have interests or relationships that might render them interested or not independent with respect to the act or transaction.
Under the DGCL, a controlling stockholder transaction that does not constitute a “going private transaction” would be entitled to the statutory safe harbor protection if it is (i) approved or recommended by a majority of disinterested directors then serving on the board (provided that a majority of all of the directors then serving are disinterested directors) or by a fully empowered committee consisting of at least two directors, each of whom is a disinterested director, in either case acting in good faith, without gross negligence and with knowledge of the material facts, (ii) approved or ratified by the informed and uncoerced vote of a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders entitled to vote thereon, or (iii) fair to the corporation and its stockholders.
A controlling stockholder transaction that constitutes a “going private transaction” may be entitled to the statutory safe harbor protection if items (i) and (ii) of the foregoing sentence are both obtained or the act or transaction is fair to the corporation and its stockholders.
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traded corporation, but Texas case law holds that controlling shareholders do not generally owe formal fiduciary duties to their fellow shareholders. While a few cases have recognized that a relationship between particular shareholders may constitute a “confidential relationship,” which could give rise to informal fiduciary duties, Texas law generally allows shareholders to act in their own interests.
Controlling Shareholder Transactions. The TBOC provides that an otherwise valid and enforceable contract or transaction between a corporation and (a) one or more directors or officers, or one or more affiliates or associates of one or more directors or officers, of the corporation; or (b) an entity or other organization in which one or more directors or officers, or one or more affiliates or associates of one or more directors or officers, of the corporation: (i) is a managerial official; or (ii) has a financial interest is valid and enforceable, and is not void or voidable, notwithstanding such relationship or interest if any one of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) the material facts as to the applicable relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed to or known by: (1) the corporation’s board of directors or a committee of the board of directors, and the board of directors or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the approval of the majority of the disinterested directors or committee members, regardless of whether the disinterested directors or committee members constitute a quorum; or (2) the shareholders entitled to vote on the authorization of the contract or transaction, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by a vote of the shareholders; or (B) the contract or transaction is fair to the corporation when the contract or transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified by the board of directors, a committee of the board of directors, or the shareholders.
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Delaware
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Texas
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The TBOC differs from the DGCL’s interested party transaction statute in that it does not turn on whether the interested party is a controlling shareholder. It also clarifies that the statutory business judgment rule applies to such transactions.
Pre-Transaction Judicial Determination of Independence. A corporation may request that a court, at the start of a transaction or investigation of a derivative claim, judicially certify the independence and disinterestedness of directors on special committees reviewing transactions or individuals on panels reviewing derivative claims. Future challenges to independence or disinterestedness would require new facts.
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Increasing or Decreasing Authorized Capital Stock, Including Number of Unissued Shares of a Series of Preferred Stock
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Under the DGCL, the board of directors cannot increase or decrease the amount of authorized capital stock without stockholder approval. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the corporation only has one class of stock outstanding and such class is not divided into series, then unless otherwise expressly required by the certificate of incorporation, stockholder approval is not required to adopt an amendment to the certificate of incorporation that effects a forward stock split and, in connection therewith, such amendment may also increase the number of authorized shares up to an amount proportionate to the subdivision without stockholder approval. See “Charter Amendments” below.
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Under the TBOC, once stock has been issued, the board of directors cannot unilaterally increase or decrease the authorized capital stock without shareholder approval unless the increase in the number of authorized shares is in connection with a forward stock split, in which case the number of authorized shares can be increased up to an amount proportionate to the subdivision without stockholder approval, provided that the corporation only has one class of stock outstanding and such class is not divided into series (unless stockholder approval is expressly required by the certificate of incorporation).
With respect to a series of shares of preferred stock established by the board of directors if authorized by the corporation’s certificate of formation (and subject thereto), unless the certificate of formation expressly restricts the board of directors from increasing or decreasing the number of unissued shares of a series to be established by the board of directors, the board of directors may increase or decrease the number of shares in each series to be established, except that the board of directors may not decrease the number of shares in a particular series to a number that is less than the number
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of shares in that series that are issued at the time of the decrease.
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Number of Directors
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Under the DGCL, the number of directors shall be fixed by, or in the manner provided in, the by-laws, unless the certificate of incorporation fixes the number of directors. If the certificate of incorporation fixes the number of directors, then a change in the number of directors shall be made only by amendment of the certificate of incorporation.
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Under the TBOC, the number of directors shall be set by, or in the manner provided by, the certificate of formation or by-laws, except that the number of directors on the initial board of directors must be set by the certificate of formation.
The number of directors may be increased or decreased by amendment to, or as provided by, the certificate of formation or by-laws.
If the certificate of formation or by-laws do not set the number constituting the board of directors or provide for the manner in which the number of directors must be determined, the number of directors is the same as the number constituting the initial board of directors as set by the certificate of formation.
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Procedures for Filling Vacant Directorships
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Under the DGCL, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws: (i) vacancies and newly created directorships resulting from any increase in the authorized number of directors elected by all of the stockholders having the right to vote as a single class may be filled by a majority of the directors then in office, although less than a quorum, or by a sole remaining director; and (ii) whenever the holders of any class or classes of stock or series thereof are entitled to elect one or more directors by the certificate of incorporation, vacancies and newly created directorships of such class or classes or series may be filled by a majority of the directors elected by such class or classes or series thereof then in office, or by a sole remaining director so elected.
In the case of a Delaware corporation the directors of which are divided into classes, any directors chosen under either (i) or (ii) of the above shall hold office until the next election of the class for which they were chosen, and until their successors are elected and qualified.
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Under the TBOC, except as provided below with respect to class voting, vacancies may be filled by the affirmative vote of the majority of the remaining directors, even if less than a quorum, or by the election at an annual or special meeting of shareholders called for that purpose.
The term of a director elected to fill a vacancy occurring in the board of directors is the unexpired term of the director’s predecessor in office and until the director’s successor is elected and qualified.
Except as provided below with respect to class voting, a directorship to be filled because of an increase in the number of directors may be filled by the shareholders or by the board of directors for a term of office continuing only until the next election of one or more directors by the shareholders. The board of directors may not fill more than two such directorships during the period between any two successive annual meetings of shareholders.
Unless otherwise authorized by a corporation’s certificate of formation, a
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vacancy or a newly created vacancy in a director position that the certificate of formation entitles the holders of a class or series of shares or group of classes or series of shares to elect may be filled only: (i) by the affirmative vote of the majority of the directors then in office elected by the class, series, or group; (ii) by the sole remaining director elected in that manner; or (iii) by the affirmative vote of the holders of the outstanding shares of the class, series, or group.
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Removal of Directors
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Under the DGCL, subject to the exceptions discussed below, holders of a majority of the voting power of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors may remove a director or the entire board of directors with or without cause.
Unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, where the board of directors of a Delaware corporation is classified (i.e., elected for staggered terms), a director may only be removed by stockholders for cause.
Where the certificate of incorporation provides that separate classes or series of stockholders are entitled, as such a class or series, to elect separate directors, in calculating the sufficiency of votes for removal without cause of such a director, only the votes of the holders of such a class or series are considered.
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Under the TBOC, subject to the exceptions discussed below or as otherwise provided by the certificate of formation or by-laws of a corporation, the holders of a majority of shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors may remove a director or the entire board of directors with or without cause.
Unless the certificate of formation provides otherwise, if a Texas corporation’s directors serve staggered terms, a director may only be removed for cause.
If the certificate of formation expressly permits cumulative voting and less than the entire board is to be removed, a director may not be removed if the votes cast against the removal would be sufficient to elect him or her if cumulatively voted at an election of the entire board of directors, or if there are classes of directors, at an election of the class of directors of which the director is a part. Where the certificate of formation provides that separate classes or series of shareholders are entitled, as such a class or series, to elect separate directors, in calculating the sufficiency of votes for the removal of such a director, only the votes of the holders of such a class or series are considered.
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Committees
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Under the DGCL, the board of directors may, by resolution, designate one or more committees, each consisting of one or more directors. The board of directors may also designate one or more director(s) as alternate committee members who can replace
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Under the TBOC, the board of directors may designate committees composed of one or more directors if authorized by the certificate of formation or the by-laws of the corporation. Once appointed, a committee has the full authority of the
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Delaware
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any absent or disqualified member. The board of directors can authorize any committee to have and to exercise all the powers and authority of the board in the management of the business, but no committee of a corporation (like the Company) formed after July 1, 1996 can: (i) approve, adopt, or recommend to the stockholders any action or matter (other than election or removal of directors) expressly required by statute to be submitted to stockholders for approval; or (ii) adopt, amend, or repeal any by-law.
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board of directors, though such authority may be limited by the resolution that created the committee, the certificate of formation, the by-laws, or the TBOC. A committee cannot (i) amend the certificate of formation, except to establish a series of shares, change the number of shares in a series, or eliminate a series of shares; (ii) propose a reduction of stated capital; (iii) approve a plan of merger, share exchange, or conversion; (iv) recommend to the shareholders the sale, lease, or exchange of all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation not made in the ordinary course of business; (v) recommend to the shareholders a voluntary winding up and termination or revocation of such action; (vi) amend, adopt, or repeal by-laws; (vii) fill board vacancies; (viii) fill committee vacancies or designate alternate committee members; (ix) fill vacancies due to an increase in the number of directors; (x) elect or remove officers or committee members; (xi) set committee member compensation; or (xii) alter or repeal a board resolution that states that the board resolution cannot be amended or repealed by a committee.
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Action by Written Consent of Directors
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Under the DGCL, unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of incorporation or by-laws, the board of directors of a Delaware corporation may act without a meeting if all of the directors consent in writing.
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Under the TBOC, unless otherwise provided by the certificate of formation or by-laws, a written consent stating the action taken and signed by all members of the board of directors of a Texas corporation is also an act of the board of directors.
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Action by Written Consent of Stockholders
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Under the DGCL, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, stockholders may act without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, with the written consent of the stockholders having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting at which all shares entitled to vote thereon were present and voted. If less than unanimous written consent is given, the corporation generally must give prompt notice of the action taken to the
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Under the TBOC, shareholders may act without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, with the written consent of (i) all shareholders or (ii) if authorized by the certificate of formation, the shareholders having at least the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to take the action that is the subject of the consent at a meeting, in which each owner or member entitled to vote on the action is present and votes. If less than unanimous written consent is given, the corporation must give prompt notice of
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Delaware
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Texas
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| | | | nonconsenting stockholders. | | |
the action taken to the non-consenting shareholders.
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Special Meetings of the Stockholders
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Under the DGCL, the board of directors, or any other one or more persons authorized in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws, may call a special meeting. Stockholders do not have a statutory right to call a special meeting, but the certificate of incorporation or by-laws for the corporation may provide for such right. Under the DGCL, the only business that may be conducted at a special meeting of the stockholders is business that is stated in the notice of meeting.
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Under the TBOC, special meetings of the shareholders of a corporation may be called by: (i) the president, the board of directors, or any other person authorized to call special meetings by the certificate of formation or by-laws of the corporation; or (ii) the holders of the percentage of shares specified in the certificate of formation, not to exceed 50% of the shares entitled to vote or, if no percentage is specified, at least 10% of all of the shares of the corporation entitled to vote at the proposed special meeting.
Under the TBOC, a corporation cannot prohibit its shareholders from calling a special meeting of shareholders.
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Adjournment of Stockholder Meetings
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Under the DGCL, unless the by-laws provide otherwise, a meeting of stockholders may be adjourned to another time or place without notice if the time, place, if any, and the means of remote communications, if any, by which stockholders and proxy holders may be deemed to be present in person and vote at such adjourned meeting are: (i) announced at the meeting at which the adjournment is taken; (ii) displayed, during the time scheduled for the meeting, on the same electronic network used to enable stockholders and proxy holders to participate in the meeting by means of remote communication; or (iii) set forth in the notice of meeting.
Under the DGCL, if a meeting of stockholders is adjourned for more than 30 days, or if after the adjournment a new record date for stockholders entitled to vote is fixed for the adjourned meeting, notice of the adjourned meeting must be given to each stockholder of record entitled to vote at the meeting, or each stockholder of record entitled to vote at the adjourned meeting as of the new record date set for notice of the adjourned meeting, respectively.
At the adjourned meeting the corporation may transact any business
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Under the TBOC, unless the certificate of formation or by-laws provide otherwise, a meeting of shareholders may be adjourned due to lack of quorum until the time and to the place as may be determined by a vote of the holders of the majority of the shares who are present or represented by proxy at the meeting.
The TBOC does not have a specific provision on the notice for an adjourned meeting or the business that may be transacted at an adjourned meeting.
Generally, under the TBOC, the only business that may be conducted at a special meeting of the shareholders is business that is within the purposes described in the notice.
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Texas
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that might have been transacted at the original meeting.
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Voting by Proxy
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Under the DGCL, a stockholder may authorize another person or persons to act for such stockholder by proxy. A proxy is valid for three years from its date unless a longer period is provided in the proxy.
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Under the TBOC, a shareholder may authorize another person or persons to act for such shareholder by proxy. A proxy is valid for eleven months from its date of execution unless otherwise provided in the proxy.
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Quorum and Required Vote for Stock Corporations
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Under the DGCL, the certificate of incorporation or by-laws of a Delaware corporation may specify the number of shares and/or the amount of other securities having voting power the holders of which must be present or represented by proxy at any meeting in order to constitute a quorum for, and the votes that shall be necessary for, the transaction of any business, but in no event shall a quorum consist of less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote at the meeting, except that, where a separate vote by a class or series or classes or series is required, a quorum shall consist of no less than one-third of the shares of such class or series or classes or series.
In the absence of such specification in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation: (i) a majority of the voting power of the shares entitled to vote, present in person or represented by proxy, shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of stockholders; (ii) in all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative vote of the majority of the voting power of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act of the stockholders; (iii) directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors; and (iv) where a separate vote by a class or series or classes or series is required, a majority of the outstanding shares of such class or series or classes or series, present in person or represented by proxy, shall constitute a quorum entitled to take action with respect to that vote on that matter and,
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Under the TBOC, subject to the following sentence, the holders of the majority of the shares entitled to vote at a meeting of the shareholders of a Texas corporation that are present or represented by proxy at the meeting are a quorum for the consideration of a matter to be presented at that meeting. The certificate of formation of a corporation may provide that a quorum is present only if: (i) the holders of a specified portion of the shares that is greater than the majority of the shares entitled to vote are represented at the meeting in person or by proxy; or (ii) the holders of a specified portion of the shares that is less than the majority but not less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote are represented at the meeting in person or by proxy.
The certificate of formation or by-laws of a corporation may provide that a director of a corporation shall be elected only if the director receives: (i) the vote of the holders of a specified portion, but not less than the majority, of the shares entitled to vote in the election of directors; (ii) the vote of the holders of a specified portion, but not less than the majority, of the shares entitled to vote in the election of directors and represented in person or by proxy at a meeting of shareholders at which a quorum is present; or (iii) the vote of the holders of a specified portion, but not less than the majority, of the votes cast by the holders of shares entitled to vote in the election of directors at a meeting of shareholders at which a quorum is present. If no standard is specified, directors of a corporation shall be elected by a plurality of the votes cast.
Subject to the following sentence, with
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in all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative vote of the majority of shares of such class or series or classes or series present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting shall be the act of such class or series or classes or series.
A by-law amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors.
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respect to a matter other than the election of directors or a matter for which the affirmative vote of the holders of a specified portion of the shares entitled to vote is required by the TBOC, the affirmative vote of the holders of the majority of the shares entitled to vote on, and who voted for, against, or expressly abstained with respect to, the matter at a shareholders’ meeting of a corporation at which a quorum is present is the act of the shareholders. With respect to a matter other than the election of directors or a matter for which the affirmative vote of the holders of a specified portion of the shares entitled to vote is required by the TBOC, the certificate of formation or by-laws of a corporation may provide that the act of the shareholders of the corporation is: (i) the affirmative vote of the holders of a specified portion, but not less than the majority, of the shares entitled to vote on that matter; (ii) the affirmative vote of the holders of a specified portion, but not less than the majority, of the shares entitled to vote on that matter and represented in person or by proxy at a shareholders’ meeting at which a quorum is present; (iii) the affirmative vote of the holders of a specified portion, but not less than the majority, of the shares entitled to vote on, and who voted for or against, the matter at a shareholders’ meeting at which a quorum is present; or (iv) the affirmative vote of the holders of a specified portion, but not less than the majority, of the shares entitled to vote on, and who voted for, against, or expressly abstained with respect to, the matter at a shareholders’ meeting at which a quorum is present.
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If the certificate of formation provides for more or less than one vote per share on a matter for all of the outstanding shares or for the shares of a class or series, each reference in the TBOC or in the certificate of formation or by-laws, unless expressly stated otherwise, to a specified portion of the shares with respect to that matter refers to the portion of the votes entitled to be cast
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with respect to those shares under the certificate of formation.
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Stockholder Vote for Fundamental Business Transactions
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Under the DGCL, a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon generally must approve fundamental changes, such as: (i) certain mergers or consolidations; (ii) a sale, lease, or exchange of all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets (as described below); (iii) dissolution; (iv) conversion of a domestic corporation to other entities; and (v) transfer, domestication or continuance of a domestic corporation to a foreign jurisdiction. The certificate of incorporation may contain provisions requiring for any corporate action the vote of a larger portion of the stock or of any class or series thereof than is required by the DGCL.
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Under the TBOC, unless otherwise provided for in the TBOC or the certificate of formation of a corporation, shareholders holding at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of a class entitled to vote on the matter must typically approve fundamental business transactions such as: (i) a merger; (ii) an interest exchange; (iii) a conversion; or (iv) a sale of all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets that is not made in the usual and regular course of the corporation’s business. The certificate of formation can provide for a different threshold of approval, but not less than a majority of the shares entitled to vote.
Except as provided by the TBOC, if a class or series of shares is entitled to vote as a class or series on a fundamental business transaction, the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares in each such class or series of shares entitled to vote on the transaction as a class or series is also required to approve the fundamental business transaction, unless a different threshold, not less than a majority, is specified in the certificate of formation. Shares entitled to vote as a class or series shall only be entitled to vote as a class or series on the fundamental business transaction unless that class or series is otherwise entitled to vote on each matter submitted to the shareholders generally or is otherwise entitled to vote under the certificate of formation. However, a corporation may include in its certificate of formation a provision that all shares vote as a single class in all instances.
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Stockholder Vote for Sales, Leases, Exchanges or Other Dispositions
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Under the DGCL, a Delaware corporation may sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets (provided that no stockholder authorization or consent is required (i) to mortgage or pledge the corporation’s property and assets unless the certificate of incorporation so
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Under the TBOC, generally the sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a Texas corporation requires the approval of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of the corporation entitled to vote, unless the corporation’s certificate
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requires or (ii) where the property or assets in the sale, lease or exchange is collateral that secures a mortgage or is pledged to a secured party and certain additional conditions are met) upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration as the board of directors deems expedient and for the best interests of the corporation, when and as authorized by a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon.
No such approval is required, however, if the assets being sold, leased or exchanged are not all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets. There is no specific quantity or percentage that definitively governs whether the asset(s) to be sold, leased or exchanged constitute(s) substantially all of the corporation’s assets. Instead, the inquiry hinges on a fact-intensive evaluation of whether the assets to be sold are quantitatively and qualitatively vital to the business of the corporation. For purposes of determining whether assets to be sold, leased or exchanged constitute substantially all of the corporation’s assets, the assets of the corporation include the assets of the corporation’s direct and indirect wholly-owned and controlled subsidiaries.
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of formation sets a lower threshold (which may not be less than a majority of the voting shares).
No such approval is required, however, if the transaction is made in the usual and regular course of a Texas corporation’s business. Under Texas law, even the transfer of substantially all of a corporation’s assets in such a manner that the corporation continues directly or indirectly to engage in one or more businesses is deemed not to be a transaction requiring shareholder approval under the TBOC.
Except as provided by the TBOC, if a class or series of shares is entitled to vote as a class or series on a sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets, the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares in each such class or series of shares entitled to vote on the transaction as a class or series is also required to approve the sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets, unless a different threshold, not less than a majority, is specified in the certificate of formation. Shares entitled to vote as a class or series shall only be entitled to vote as a class or series on the fundamental business transaction unless that class or series is otherwise entitled to vote on each matter submitted to the shareholders generally or is otherwise entitled to vote under the certificate of formation, although a corporation may provide that all shares vote as a single class even in such transactions.
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Charter Amendments
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Under the DGCL, subject to limited exceptions, an amendment to the certificate of incorporation must be approved (i) by the board of directors and (ii) then, by the holders of a majority of the voting power of a Delaware corporation’s outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon, unless the certificate of incorporation provides for a greater number. Whether or not entitled to vote by the certificate of
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Under the TBOC, subject to limited exceptions, an amendment to the certificate of formation requires the approval of (i) the board of directors and (ii) the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of a Texas corporation, unless a different threshold, not less than a majority, is specified in the certificate of formation.
If a class or series of shares is entitled
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incorporation, the holders of the outstanding shares of a class are entitled to vote as a class on a proposed amendment, if the amendment would (1) increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of such class; (2) increase or decrease the par value of the shares of such class; or (3) alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to affect them adversely. However, the DGCL permits corporations to provide in their certificate of incorporation that no separate class vote(s) shall be required to increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of such class, in which case a share increase/decrease amendment would instead be approved by the holders of all outstanding shares, voting together as a single class.
In addition, unless otherwise expressly required by the certificate of incorporation: (i) no meeting or vote of stockholders is required to adopt an amendment that reclassifies by subdividing the issued shares of a class of stock into a greater number of issued shares of the same class of stock (and, in connection therewith, such amendment may increase the number of authorized shares of such class of stock up to an amount proportionate to the subdivision), provided the corporation has only one class of stock outstanding and such class is not divided into series; and (ii) an amendment to increase or decrease the authorized number of shares of a class of capital stock or an amendment to reclassify by combining the issued shares of a class of capital stock into a lesser number of issued shares of the same class of stock may be made and effected, without obtaining the vote or votes of stockholders described in the preceding paragraph if: (A) the shares of such class are listed on a national securities exchange immediately before such amendment becomes effective and meet the listing requirements of such national securities exchange relating to
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to vote as a class or series on an amendment to the certificate of formation, the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds, unless a different threshold, not less than a majority, is specified in the certificate of formation, of the outstanding shares in each such class or series of shares entitled to vote on the amendment as a class or series is also required to approve an amendment to the certificate of formation, although the TBOC allows corporations to provide that all shares vote as a single class for such an amendment. In addition, the TBOC also allows corporations to provide in their certificate of formation that no separate class vote(s) shall be required to increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of a class, in which case a share increase/decrease amendment would instead be approved by the holders of all outstanding shares, voting together as a single class.
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the minimum number of holders immediately after such amendment becomes effective, (B) at a properly called meeting, a vote of the stockholders entitled to vote thereon, voting as a single class, is taken for and against the proposed amendment, and the votes cast for the amendment exceed the votes cast against the amendment, and (C) if the amendment increases or decreases the authorized number of shares of a class of capital stock for which no provision in the certificate of incorporation has been made in accordance with the DGCL, the votes cast for the amendment by the holders of such class exceed the votes cast against the amendment by the holders of such class.
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By-Law Amendments
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Under the DGCL, stockholders of a Delaware corporation entitled to vote thereon have the right to amend, repeal or adopt the by-laws. If a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation so provides, the Delaware corporation’s board of directors may also have the right to amend, repeal or adopt the by-laws.
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Generally, under the TBOC, the board of directors may amend, repeal or adopt a Texas corporation’s by-laws. However, (i) the shareholders may amend, repeal or adopt by-laws even if the directors also have that power and (ii) a Texas corporation’s certificate of formation may wholly or partly reserve the power to amend, repeal or adopt by-laws exclusively to the shareholders. Similarly, the shareholders, in amending, repealing or adopting a particular by-law, may expressly provide that the board of directors may not amend, readopt or repeal that by-law.
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Dividends and Distributions
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Under the DGCL, a Delaware corporation may, subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate of incorporation, pay dividends out of surplus or, if there is no surplus, out of net profits for the current and/or the preceding fiscal year, unless the capital of the corporation is less than the capital represented by issued and outstanding stock having preferences on asset distributions. The DGCL defines surplus as the excess, at any time, of the net assets of a corporation over its stated capital.
In addition, a Delaware corporation may not pay dividends if doing so would render the corporation insolvent in the sense that it could not pay its
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Under the TBOC, a distribution is defined as a transfer of cash or other property (except a corporation’s own shares or rights to acquire its shares or a split-up or division of the issued shares of a class of a corporation into a larger number of shares within the same class that does not increase the stated capital of the corporation), or an issuance of debt, by a corporation to its shareholders in the form of: (i) a dividend on any class or series of a Texas corporation’s outstanding shares; (ii) a purchase or redemption, directly or indirectly, of its shares; or (iii) a payment in liquidation of all or a portion of its assets.
Under the TBOC, a Texas corporation
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Delaware
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Texas
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debts as they come due or it would have an unreasonably small amount of capital for the business in which it is engaged or intends to engage, and also may not pay dividends if doing so would impair the corporation’s ability to continue as a going concern.
Under the DGCL, in the case of a willful or negligent violation of the statutory restrictions on dividends or stock purchases or redemptions, the directors under whose administration the violation occurs are, subject to applicable defenses, jointly and severally liable to the corporation and, in the event of its dissolution or insolvency, its creditors for the full amount of the dividend unlawfully paid or the amount unlawfully paid for the purchase or redemption, together with interest.
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may not make a distribution if such distribution violates its certificate of formation, if the corporation’s surplus is less than the amount of the corporation’s stated capital (as determined by the TBOC) or, unless a Texas corporation is in receivership or the distribution is made in connection with the winding up and termination of the Texas corporation, if it either renders a Texas corporation unable to pay its debts as they become due in the course of its business or affairs, or exceeds, depending on the type of distribution, either the net assets or the surplus of the Texas corporation, or, subject to certain exceptions, if the distribution will be made to shareholders of another class or series.
Under the TBOC, directors who vote for or assent to a prohibited distribution are, subject to applicable statutory exceptions and defenses, jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount by which the distribution exceeds the amount permitted to be distributed.
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Stock Redemption and Repurchase
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Under the DGCL, a Delaware corporation may purchase or redeem shares of any class unless its capital is impaired or would be impaired by such purchase or redemption, except that the corporation may, however, purchase or redeem out of capital, shares that are entitled upon any distribution of its assets to a preference over another class or series of its stock, or, if no shares entitled to such a preference are outstanding, any of its own shares, if such shares are to be retired and the capital reduced. However, a corporation may not purchase redeemable shares for a price greater than that at which they would be redeemed.
In addition, a Delaware corporation may not effect a repurchase or redemption if doing so would render the corporation insolvent in the sense that it could not pay its debts as they come due or it would have an unreasonably small amount of capital for the business in which it is engaged or
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As noted above, under the TBOC, the purchase or redemption by a Texas corporation of its shares constitutes a distribution. Accordingly, the discussion above relating to distributions is applicable to stock redemptions and repurchases.
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Delaware
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Texas
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intends to engage, and also may not repurchase or redeem shares if doing so would impair the corporation’s ability to continue as a going concern.
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Ratification
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Under the DGCL, there is a codified ratification process for defective corporate acts.
The board of directors must adopt a resolution that, among other things, ratifies the defective corporate act and, if stockholder approval would have been required for the defective corporate act to have been taken, the defective corporate act must be submitted to stockholders for approval (subject to exceptions).
In addition to the foregoing, under the DGCL, the corporation, any successor entity to the corporation, any director, or certain stockholders can apply to the Delaware Court of Chancery for an order determining the validity and effectiveness of defective corporate acts, including without limitation to confirm whether a prior ratification was effective and whether a defective corporate act can be validated even if not previously ratified. In connection with such applications, the Delaware Court of Chancery has broad discretion to fashion appropriate relief, including without limitation declaring ratifications effective, validating and declaring effective any defective corporate act, and making such other orders regarding such matters as it deems proper under the circumstances.
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Under the TBOC, there is a codified ratification process for defective corporate acts.
The board of directors must adopt a resolution and then submit the ratified defective corporate act for shareholder approval (shareholder approval is subject to certain exceptions). In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the board of directors of a Texas corporation that shares of the Texas corporation are valid shares or putative shares is conclusive, unless otherwise determined by a Texas district court or the Texas Business Court.
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Inspection of Books and Records
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Under the DGCL, any stockholder may inspect a Delaware corporation’s books and records during normal business hours for any proper purpose (defined to mean a purpose reasonably related to the stockholder’s interest as a stockholder) upon written demand under oath stating if (i) the demand is made in good faith and for a proper purpose, (ii) the demand describes with reasonable particularity the stockholder’s purpose and the books and records the stockholder seeks to inspect and (iii) the books and records sought are specifically related to the
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Under the TBOC, a shareholder may inspect a Texas corporation’s books and records during normal business hours upon written demand stating a proper purpose if such shareholder holds at least 5% of the outstanding shares or has been a holder of shares for at least six months prior to such demand. Books and records do not include emails, text messages, social media information and similar electronic communications unless such communications effectuate a corporate action.
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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stockholder’s purpose.
The DGCL generally defines “books and records” to mean (i) the certificate of incorporation and by-laws; (ii) the annual financial statements for the preceding three years; (iii) stockholder meeting minutes, stockholder consents and communications to stockholders generally within the preceding three years; (iv) minutes and records of actions of the board of directors or a committee thereof and any materials provided to the board of directors or a committee in connection with actions taken thereby; (v) agreements between the corporation and one or more current or prospective stockholders entered into under Section 122(18) of the DGCL; and (vi) director and officer questionnaires.
If a Delaware corporation refuses to permit inspection or does not reply to the demand within five business days after the demand has been made, the stockholder may apply to the Delaware Court for an order to compel such inspection.
Generally, the stockholder bears the burden of showing that each category of requested records is essential to accomplish the stockholder’s stated purpose for the inspection.
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If a Texas corporation refuses to allow a person to examine and make copies of account records, minutes, and share transfer records under the TBOC, the Texas corporation is liable to the shareholder for any cost or expense, including attorney’s fees, incurred in enforcing the shareholder’s rights under the TBOC.
A Texas corporation may defend against an inspection action by establishing that the shareholder: (i) has sold or offered for sale, or has aided or abetted a person in procuring a list of shareholders or of holders of voting trust certificates for the purpose of selling, a list of shareholders or of holders of voting trust certificates for shares of the Texas corporation or any other corporation within the two years preceding the date the action is brought; (ii) has improperly used information obtained through prior examination of the books, account records, minutes, or share transfer records of the corporation or any other corporation; or (iii) was not acting in good faith or for a proper purpose in making the request. A shareholder request for corporate records is not made for a proper purpose if the corporation reasonably determines that the request relates to an active or pending derivative suit or litigation that is or is expected to be instituted by such shareholder or that involves or is expected to involve the corporation as an adversarial party.
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Insurance
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Under the DGCL, a Delaware corporation is allowed to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise against any liability asserted against such person and incurred by such person in any such capacity, or arising out of such person’s status as such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to
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Under the TBOC, a Texas enterprise is allowed to purchase or procure or establish and maintain insurance or another arrangement to indemnify or hold harmless an existing or former governing person, delegate, officer, employee, or agent against any liability: (i) asserted against and incurred by the person in that capacity or (ii) arising out of the person’s status in that capacity. The insurance or other arrangement established may insure or indemnify against the liability described above without regard to whether the enterprise otherwise would have had the
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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indemnify such person against such liability under the DGCL. The DGCL also authorizes a Delaware corporation to self-insure its directors, officers, employees or agents through captive insurance, subject to certain requirements and limitations.
The DGCL does not prohibit a Delaware corporation from establishing and maintaining arrangements, other than insurance, to protect such persons, including a trust fund or surety arrangement.
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power to indemnify the person against that liability under the TBOC. Under the TBOC, for the benefit of persons to be indemnified by the enterprise, an enterprise may, in addition to purchasing or procuring or establishing and maintaining insurance or another arrangement: (1) create a trust fund; (2) establish any form of self-insurance, including a contract to indemnify; (3) secure the enterprise’s indemnity obligation by grant of a security interest or other lien on the assets of the enterprise; or (4) establish a letter of credit, guaranty, or surety arrangement.
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Interested Party Transaction Approvals
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Section 144 of the DGCL provides safe harbor procedures for acts or transactions in which one or more directors or officers as well as controlling stockholders and members of control groups have interests or relationships that might render them interested or not independent with respect to the act or transaction. If one of the statutory safe harbors applies, the act or transaction at issue may not be the subject of equitable relief or give rise to an award of damages against a director or officer. Section 144 of the DGCL provides that certain acts or transactions involving interested directors or officers will be protected if the act or transaction is (i) approved or recommended by a majority of the disinterested directors, either serving on a board of directors or a committee of the board of directors, in either case acting in good faith, without gross negligence and with knowledge as to the material facts, (ii) approved or ratified by an informed, uncoerced, affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders entitled to vote thereon, or (iii) fair to the corporation and its stockholders. If a majority of the directors are not disinterested directors with respect to the act or transaction, any such disinterested director approval or recommendation must be provided through a disinterested director committee that consists of two or more directors, each of whom the board of
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The TBOC provides that an otherwise valid and enforceable contract or transaction between a corporation and (a) one or more directors or officers, or one or more affiliates or associates of one or more directors or officers, of the corporation; or (b) an entity or other organization in which one or more directors or officers, or one or more affiliates or associates of one or more directors or officers, of the corporation: (i) is a managerial official; or (ii) has a financial interest is valid and enforceable, and is not void or voidable, notwithstanding such relationship or interest if any one of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) the material facts as to the applicable relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed to or known by: (1) the corporation’s board of directors or a committee of the board of directors, and the board of directors or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the approval of the majority of the disinterested directors or committee members, regardless of whether the disinterested directors or committee members constitute a quorum; or (2) the shareholders entitled to vote on the authorization of the contract or transaction, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by a vote of the shareholders; or (B) the contract or transaction is fair to the corporation when the contract or transaction is
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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directors has determined to be a disinterested director with respect to the act or transaction. Under the DGCL, a controlling stockholder transaction that does not constitute a “going private transaction” would be entitled to the statutory safe harbor protection if it is (i) approved or recommended by a fully empowered committee of disinterested directors acting in good faith, without gross negligence and with knowledge of the material facts, (ii) approved or ratified by the informed and uncoerced vote of a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders entitled to vote thereon, or (iii) fair to the corporation and its stockholders. A controlling stockholder transaction that constitutes a “going private transaction” may be entitled to the statutory safe harbor protection if items (i) and (ii) of the foregoing sentence are both obtained or the act or transaction is fair to the corporation and its stockholders. For a corporation, like the Company, with a class of equity securities subject to Section 12(g) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act or listed on a national securities exchange, a “going private transaction” means a Rule 13e-3 transaction, as defined in Rule 13e-3(a)(3) promulgated under the Exchange Act.
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authorized, approved, or ratified by the board of directors, a committee of the board of directors, or the shareholders.
The TBOC differs from the DGCL’s interested party transaction statute in that it does not turn on whether the interested party is a controlling shareholder. It also clarifies that the statutory business judgment rule applies to such transactions.
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Under the DGCL, a “controlling stockholder” is defined as any person who, together with that person’s affiliates and associates, either (i) owns or controls a majority in voting power of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors or in the election of directors who have a majority in voting power of the votes of all directors on the board of directors, (ii) has the right, by contract or otherwise, to cause the election of nominees who are selected at the discretion of such person and who constitute either a majority of the members of the board of directors or directors entitled to cast a majority in voting power of the votes of all directors on the board of directors, or
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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(iii) has the power functionally equivalent to that of a stockholder that owns or controls a majority in voting power of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors by virtue of ownership or control of at least one-third in voting power of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors or for the election of directors who have a majority in voting power of the votes of all directors on the board of directors and power to exercise managerial authority over the business and affairs of the corporation.
A “control group” is defined under the DGCL to mean two or more persons who are not controlling stockholders who, by virtue of an agreement, arrangement or understanding between or among those persons, constitute a controlling stockholder.
A “disinterested director” is defined as a director who is not party to the act or transaction being considered and who does not have a material interest in that act or transaction or a material relationship with a person that has a material interest in the act or transaction.
A “material relationship” is defined as a familial, financial, professional, employment or other relationship that would be reasonably expected to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment when participating in the negotiation, authorization or approval of the act or transaction at issue.
A “material interest” is defined as an actual or potential benefit, including the avoidance of a detriment, other than one which would devolve on the corporation or the stockholders generally, that (i) in the case of a director, would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment when participating in the negotiation, authorization or approval of the act or transaction at issue and (ii) in the case of a
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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stockholder or any other person (other than a director), would be material to such stockholder or such other person.
In addition, under the DGCL, any director of a corporation that has a class of stock listed on a national securities exchange is presumed to be a disinterested director with respect to an act or transaction to which that director is not a party if the board of directors has determined that the director satisfies the relevant criteria for determining director independence from the corporation and, if applicable, the controlling stockholder or control group, under any rules promulgated by the applicable exchange. This presumption may only be rebutted by substantial and particularized facts that the director has a material interest in the act or transaction or has a material relationship with a person with a material interest in the act or transaction.
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Limitation of Liability of Stockholders
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Under the DGCL, unless the certificate of incorporation otherwise provides, the stockholders of a corporation shall not be personally liable for the payment of the corporation’s debts except as they may be liable by reason of their own conduct or acts.
Delaware law permits stockholders to be liable under the doctrine of veil piercing, which allows the court to apply a multi-factor test to determine whether to hold a stockholder liable for obligations of a corporation.
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A shareholder is not liable to the corporation or its creditors for: (i) the shares, other than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full amount of consideration; (ii) the corporation’s contractual obligations based on an alter ego theory, a theory of fraud, or other similar theories; or (iii) the corporation’s obligations due to a failure to follow corporate formalities required by the TBOC or the corporation’s governing documents.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a shareholder may be liable to a creditor of the corporation if: (1) the shareholder used or caused the corporation to commit actual fraud primarily for the shareholder’s direct personal benefit; (2) the shareholder expressly assumes, guarantees, or agrees to be personally liable; or (3) the TBOC or another applicable statute imposes liability on the shareholder.
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Limitation of Personal Liability of Directors and Officers and Controlling Stockholders
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Under the DGCL, a Delaware corporation is permitted to adopt a provision in its certificate of incorporation eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director or
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Under the TBOC, a Texas corporation is permitted to provide that a director or officer is not liable, or is liable only to the extent provided by the certificate of formation, to the corporation or its
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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officer to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer, provided that such provision does not eliminate or limit the liability of: (i) a director or officer breaching the duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) a director or officer failing to act in good faith, engaging in intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) a director declaring an illegal dividend or approving an illegal stock purchase or redemption; (iv) a director or officer obtaining an improper personal benefit from the corporation; or (v) an officer in any action by or in the right of a Delaware corporation.
The DGCL further provides that controlling stockholders and control groups, in their capacity as such, cannot be liable for monetary damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of care.
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shareholders for monetary damages for an act or omission by the person in the person’s capacity as a director or officer.
The TBOC does not, however, permit any limitation of the liability of a director or officer for: (i) a breach of the duty of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders; (ii) an act or omission not in good faith that constitutes a breach of duty of the person to the corporation or involves intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) a transaction from which the director or officer obtains an improper benefit, regardless of whether the benefit resulted from an action taken within the scope of the person’s duties; or (iv) an act or omission for which the liability of a director or officer is expressly provided by an applicable statute (such as wrongful distributions).
Further, corporations and their shareholders will not have a cause of action against a director or officer of the corporation as a result of any act or failure to act, unless: (1) the presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted; (2) the director’s or officer’s act or failure to act constituted a breach of a fiduciary duty; and (3) such breach involved fraud, intentional misconduct, an ultra vires act, or a knowing violation of law. This standard governs director and officer liability in all circumstances.
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Considerations by Directors Permitted by Statute
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Under the DGCL, directors of Delaware corporations do not have any express statutory authority to consider constituencies beyond stockholders when discharging their fiduciary duties. Delaware case law provides that fiduciary duties generally require directors to seek to maximize the value of the corporation for the long-term benefit of the stockholders and that directors can consider the interests of other constituencies so long as doing so serves the ultimate goal of value maximization.
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Under the TBOC, in discharging the duties of a director and in considering the best interests of the corporation, a director is entitled to consider the long-term and short-term interests of the corporation and the shareholders of the corporation, including the possibility that those interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
In discharging the duties of a director or officer under the TBOC or otherwise, a director or officer of a corporation is entitled to consider any social purpose specified in the corporation’s certificate of formation. In addition, the TBOC
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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provides that nothing in the applicable section thereof prohibits or limits a director or officer of a corporation that does not have a social purpose specified as a purpose in the corporation’s certificate of formation from considering, approving, or taking an action that promotes or has the effect of promoting a social, charitable, or environmental purpose.
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Business Opportunities
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Under Delaware law, the corporate opportunity doctrine holds that a corporate officer or director may not generally and unilaterally take a business opportunity for his or her own. Factors to be considered include: (i) whether the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; (ii) if the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; (iii) whether the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (iv) whether by taking the opportunity for his or her own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimical to his or her duties to the corporation.
The DGCL permits a Delaware corporation to renounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of the board of directors, any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified business opportunities or specified classes or categories of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or one or more of its officers, directors or stockholders.
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Texas law is generally similar to the Delaware corporate opportunity doctrine.
The TBOC permits a Texas entity to renounce, in its certificate of formation or by action of its board of directors, an interest or expectancy of the entity in, or an interest or expectancy of the entity in being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified business opportunities or a specified class or category of business opportunities presented to the entity or one or more of its directors, officers or owners.
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Indemnification of Directors and Officers
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Under the DGCL, a Delaware corporation is permitted to indemnify any person who is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, against expenses (including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by the person in connection
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Under the TBOC, a Texas corporation is permitted to indemnify a director, former director, or delegate who was, is, or is threatened to be made a respondent in a proceeding, against (i) judgments and (ii) expenses (other than a judgment) reasonably and actually incurred by the person in connection with a proceeding if the person: (a) acted in good faith; (b) reasonably believed, in the case of conduct in the person’s official capacity, that the person’s conduct was in the
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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with any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, other than an action by or in the right of the corporation, to which such director, officer, employee or agent may be a party or threatened to be made a party, provided such person acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed was in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and in the case of a criminal proceeding, that he or she had no reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was unlawful.
In connection with any threatened, pending or completed action by or in the right of the corporation involving a person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, a Delaware corporation has the power to indemnify such a person who is a party or is threatened to be made a party for expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually and reasonably incurred in connection with the defense or settlement of such action or suit: (i) if such person acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation; and (ii) if such person is found liable to the corporation, only to the extent the Court of Chancery or the court in which such action or suit was brought determined that in view of all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such expenses which the Court of Chancery or such other court shall deem proper. This is not exclusive of any other indemnification rights, which may be granted by a Delaware corporation to its directors, officers, employees or agents.
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corporation’s best interests, and in any other case, that the person’s conduct was not opposed to the corporation’s best interests; and (c) in the case of a criminal proceeding, did not have a reasonable cause to believe the person’s conduct was unlawful. In addition, the TBOC permits indemnification of other persons as described in the section entitled “Persons Covered” below.
If, however, the person is found liable to a Texas corporation, or is found liable on the basis that he or she received an improper personal benefit, then indemnification under the TBOC is limited to the reimbursement of reasonable expenses actually incurred in connection with the proceeding, and which excludes a judgment, a penalty, a fine, and an excise or similar tax, including an excise tax assessed against the person with respect to an employee benefit plan. Furthermore, no indemnification will be available if the person is found liable for: (i) willful or intentional misconduct in the performance of the person’s duty to the corporation; (ii) breach of the person’s duty of loyalty owed to the corporation; or (iii) an act or omission not committed in good faith that constitutes a breach of a duty owed by the person to the corporation.
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Advancement of Expenses
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Under the DGCL, expenses (including attorneys’ fees) incurred by a current or former officer or director of the corporation in defending any civil,
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Under the TBOC, a corporation may pay or reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by a present director or officer who was, is, or is threatened to be made
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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criminal, administrative or investigative action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding; provided that, in the case of a current director or officer, any such advancement shall be conditioned upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined that such person is not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation as authorized in Section 145 of the DGCL.
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a respondent in a proceeding in advance of the final disposition of the proceeding without making the determinations required for permissive indemnification after the corporation receives: (1) a written affirmation by the person of the person’s good-faith belief that the person has met the standard of conduct necessary for indemnification; and (2) a written undertaking by or on behalf of the person to repay the amount paid or reimbursed if the final determination is that the person has not met that standard or that indemnification is prohibited by the TBOC.
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Procedure for Indemnification
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Under the DGCL, a determination that indemnification of a current director or officer is appropriate generally must be made: (i) by a majority vote of directors who are not party to the proceeding, even though less than a quorum; (ii) by a committee of such directors designated by majority vote of such directors, even though less than a quorum; (iii) if there are no such directors or if such directors so direct, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion; or (iv) by the stockholders.
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Under the TBOC, a determination that indemnification is appropriate generally must be made: (i) by a majority vote of the directors who, at the time of the vote, are disinterested and independent, regardless of whether such directors constitute a quorum; (ii) by a majority vote of a special committee of the board of directors if the committee is designated by a majority vote of the directors who at the time of the vote are disinterested and independent, regardless of whether such directors constitute a quorum, and is composed solely of one or more directors who are disinterested and independent; (iii) by special legal counsel selected by majority vote under (i) or (ii) above; (iv) by the shareholders in a vote that excludes those shares held by directors who, at the time of the vote, are not disinterested and independent; or (v) by a unanimous vote of the shareholders of the corporation.
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Mandatory Indemnification
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The DGCL requires a Delaware corporation to indemnify current directors and certain officers against expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually and reasonably incurred in successfully defending, on the merits or otherwise, against any action, suit or proceeding described above, or any claim, issue or matter therein.
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The TBOC requires indemnification for reasonable expenses actually incurred only if the director is wholly successful on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of the proceeding.
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Persons Covered
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Under the DGCL, directors and officers, but not employees, agents, or others, are entitled to mandatory
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Under the TBOC, a corporation may indemnify and advance expenses to a person who is not a director, including
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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indemnification for expenses incurred when successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of litigation. Other than in that instance, the DGCL authorizes a Delaware corporation to provide the same indemnification rights to directors, officers, employees, agents of the corporation, and those serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise.
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an officer, employee or agent, as provided by: (i) the corporation’s governing documents; (ii) general or specific action of the corporation’s board of directors; (iii) resolution of the shareholders; (iv) contract; or (v) common law. A corporation must indemnify an officer to the same extent that indemnification is required under the TBOC for a director. A determination of indemnification for a person who is not a director of a corporation, including an officer, employee, or agent, is not required to be made in accordance with the procedures set out in the relevant sections of the TBOC.
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Rights Plans
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Stockholder rights plans have generally been upheld by Delaware courts. Adoption of stockholder rights plans is viewed as a defensive action and is subject to enhanced scrutiny by the Delaware courts, with the burden initially on the board of directors to demonstrate that the adoption of the rights plan is reasonable in response to a reasonably identified threat posed.
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Texas case law has generally upheld shareholder rights plans, but indicates that rights plans will be scrutinized for validity at the time of adoption and for continued validity in the face of changing circumstances.
In addition, the TBOC expressly permits directors to look to the “long-term” benefit to shareholders in taking action.
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Selection of Forum/Venue
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Under the DGCL, a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation or by-laws may require, consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in Delaware, and no provision of a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation or by-laws may prohibit bringing such claims in the courts of Delaware.
“Internal corporate claims” means claims, including claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity; or (ii) as to which the DGCL confers jurisdiction upon the Delaware Court of Chancery.
With respect to claims that are not internal corporate claims, a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation or by-laws may require
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Under the TBOC, the governing documents of a Texas entity may require, consistent with applicable state and federal jurisdictional requirements, that any internal entity claims shall be brought only in a court in Texas and that one or more courts in Texas having jurisdiction shall serve as the exclusive forum and venue in such disputes. Further, a Texas corporation may include a waiver of jury trial concerning internal entity claims in its by-laws.
“Internal entity claim” means a claim of any nature, including a derivative claim in the right of an entity, that is based on, arises from, or relates to the internal affairs of the entity. Internal affairs include the rights, powers, and duties of the entity’s governing persons, officers, owners, and members, and matters relating to the entity’s membership or ownership interests.
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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stockholders, when acting in their capacity as stockholders or in the right of the corporation, to bring any or all such claims only in one or more prescribed forums or venues, if such claims relate to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, or the rights or powers of the corporation or its stockholders, directors or officers; provided that such requirement is consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements and allows a stockholder to bring such claims in at least one court in Delaware that has jurisdiction over such claims.
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Pre-Suit Demand in Derivative Suits
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Under Delaware court rules and case law, in order for a stockholder to commence a derivative action on behalf of the corporation, the stockholder must: (i) make a demand on the company’s board of directors; or (ii) show that demand would be futile.
Demand will be deemed futile if at least half the members of the board in receipt of the demand: (1) received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand; (2) faces a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that would be the subject of the litigation demand; or (3) lacks independence from someone who received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that would be the subject of the litigation demand or who would face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand.
If demand is excused, the board of directors of a Delaware corporation can form an independent special litigation committee to take control of the litigation. If such a committee determines dismissal is appropriate and moves to dismiss the derivative suit, the court will evaluate the independence and good faith of the committee, the reasonableness of its investigation into the subject of the demand, and the proffered reasons for dismissing the demand. The court will then apply its
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Texas is a universal demand jurisdiction. Under the TBOC, the focus is on harm to the corporation rather than the Delaware standard of futility. A shareholder may not institute a derivative proceeding until the 91st day after the date a written demand is filed with the corporation stating with particularity the act, omission, or other matter that is the subject of the claim or challenge and requesting that the corporation take suitable action.
The foregoing waiting period is not required or, if applicable, shall terminate if: (i) the shareholder has been notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation; (ii) the corporation is suffering irreparable injury; or (iii) irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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own judgment to determine whether the dismissal was in fact in the best interests of the corporation.
If a demand is received and the board or a board committee refuses to pursue litigation, the business judgment rule applies to the board or committee’s decision, and a plaintiff claiming wrongful demand refusal must allege particularized facts that raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the board’s determination to refuse the demand was the product of valid business judgment.
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Stock Ownership Requirement for Derivative Suits; Jury Trials
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Under the DGCL, subject to limited exceptions, a stockholder may not institute or maintain a derivative suit unless the plaintiff was a stockholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains or that such stockholder’s stock thereafter devolved upon such stockholder by operation of law, and the plaintiff maintains such ownership throughout the litigation. The Company understands that certain Delaware corporations have included an ownership threshold for derivative claims in their by-laws; however, the Delaware courts have not opined on the enforceability of these provisions.
Jury trials are generally not available in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which is the court in which stockholder suits relating to the internal affairs of a Delaware corporation must be filed.
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Under the TBOC, a shareholder may not institute or maintain a derivative proceeding unless: (i) the shareholder was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction in question, or became a shareholder by operation of law originating from a person that was a shareholder at the time of the transaction in question; and (ii) the shareholder fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation. Further, publicly traded corporations and corporations with over 500 shareholders, may set an ownership threshold in their governing documents (not to exceed 3%) that shareholders must satisfy to bring a derivative claim.
Under Texas law, in civil cases, a party generally has a right to a jury trial to determine questions of fact if the party timely demands a jury and pays the jury fee. A corporation may include a waiver of jury trial in its by-laws, and such waiver will constitute an intentional consent to waiver if enforced against a party approving the by-laws or acquiring a security after such by-laws are adopted, continuing to hold a security of a public company after the by-laws are adopted, or by other methods permitted under law.
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Dissent and Appraisal Rights
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Under the DGCL, a stockholder of a corporation that is a constituent in a merger, consolidation, conversion, domestication, transfer, or continuance may, under certain circumstances, be
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Under the TBOC, except for the limited classes of mergers, consolidations, sales and asset dispositions for which no shareholder approval is required under Texas law, shareholders of Texas
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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entitled to appraisal rights pursuant to which the stockholder may receive cash in the fair value of their shares as determined by the Delaware Court of Chancery.
Under the DGCL, stockholders have no appraisal rights in the event of a merger, consolidation, conversion, domestication, transfer or continuance if (i) prior to the effective time of the transaction the stock of the corporation is listed on a national securities exchange or is held of record by more than 2,000 stockholders, and (ii) in the merger, consolidation conversion, domestication, transfer or continuance they receive solely shares of stock of the surviving corporation or entity or of any other corporation that shares at the effective date of the merger or consolidation will be either listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than 2,000 stockholders.
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corporations with voting rights have dissenters’ rights in the event of a merger, consolidation, interest exchange, conversion, sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all, or substantially all, the property and assets of the corporation. However, a shareholder of a Texas corporation has no dissenters’ rights with respect to any plan of merger or conversion in which there is a single surviving or new domestic or foreign corporation, or with respect to any plan of exchange if: (i) the ownership interest, or a depository receipt in respect of the ownership interest, held by the owner is part of a class or series of ownership interests, or depository receipts in respect of ownership interests, that are, on the record date set for purposes of determining which owners are entitled to vote on the plan of merger, conversion, or exchange, as appropriate: (A) listed on a national securities exchange; or (B) held of record by at least 2,000 owners; (ii) the owner is not required by the terms of the plan of merger, conversion, or exchange, as appropriate, to accept for the owner’s ownership interest any consideration that is different from the consideration to be provided to any other holder of an ownership interest of the same class or series as the ownership interest held by the owner, other than cash instead of fractional shares or interests the owner would otherwise be entitled to receive; and (iii) the owner is not required by the terms of the plan of merger, conversion, or exchange, as appropriate, to accept for the owner’s ownership interest any consideration other than: (A) ownership interests, or depository receipts in respect of ownership interests, of another entity of the same general organizational type that, immediately after the effective date of the merger, conversion, or exchange, as appropriate, will be part of a class or series of ownership interests, or depository receipts in respect of ownership interests, that are: (1) listed on a national securities exchange or
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Issue
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Delaware
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Texas
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authorized for listing on the exchange on official notice of issuance; or (2) held of record by at least 2,000 owners; (B) cash instead of fractional ownership interests the owner would otherwise be entitled to receive; or (C) any combination of the ownership interests and cash above.
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Independence of Corporate Code
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Delaware does not have an applicable statute.
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The TBOC provides that the plain meaning of its terms may not be supplanted, contravened, or modified by the laws or judicial decisions of any other jurisdiction; however, an officer or director is not in breach of their duties if they consider other jurisdictions.
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Judicial Certification of Committees and Panels
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Delaware does not have an applicable statute.
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A corporation may request that a court, at the start of a transaction or investigation of a derivative claim, judicially certify the independence and disinterestedness of directors on special committees reviewing transactions or individuals on panels reviewing derivative claims. Future challenges to independence or disinterestedness would require new facts.
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Regulation of Proxy Advisors
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Delaware does not have an applicable statute.
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A proxy advisor that makes a voting recommendation concerning the shares of a Texas corporation, or a corporation headquartered in Texas, must either make such recommendation solely in the financial interests of shareholders or disclose the non-financial factors that subordinate shareholder financial interest.
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Threshold for Stockholder Proposals
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Delaware does not have an applicable statute.
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A Texas public corporation that is either headquartered in Texas or that is listed on a Texas stock exchange may prohibit shareholders from including proposals on the corporation’s proxy unless they have held more than the lesser of (i) $1,000,000 of stock or (ii) at least 3% of the corporation’s voting shares, for a continuous period of at least six months before the date of the meeting and throughout the entire duration of the meeting. The proposing shareholder must also solicit the holders of shares representing at least 67% of the voting power of shares entitled to vote on the proposal.
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1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
Attention: Corporate Secretary
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Class A Common Stock
(on a fully exchanged and converted basis) |
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Class B Common Stock
(on a fully exchanged and converted basis)(1) |
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Combined
Voting Power(2) |
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Number
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Percentage
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Number
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Percentage
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Percentage
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As of November 4, 2026 (unless otherwise stated in the footnotes below)
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| Name of Beneficial Owner | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5% Equity Holders | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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TJMT Holdings LLC(3)
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| | | | 66,817,505 | | | | | | 43.0% | | | | | | 60,091,740 | | | | | | 100.0% | | | | | | 87.2% | | |
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Virtu Employee Holdco LLC(4)
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| | | | 2,690,834 | | | | | | 1.7% | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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BlackRock, Inc.(5)
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| | | | 9,633,953 | | | | | | 6.2% | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Vanguard Portfolio Management LLC(6)
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| | | | 5,546,296 | | | | | | 3.6% | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Vanguard Capital Management LLC(7)
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| | | | 4,351,457 | | | | | | 2.8% | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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FMR LLC(8)
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| | | | 4,925,203 | | | | | | 3.2% | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
| Directors and Executive Officers | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Michael T. Viola(3)
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| | | | 66,817,505 | | | | | | 43.0% | | | | | | 60,091,740 | | | | | | 100.0% | | | | | | 87.2% | | |
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Vincent Viola(3)
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| | | | 66,817,505 | | | | | | 43.0% | | | | | | 60,091,740 | | | | | | 100.0% | | | | | | 87.2% | | |
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Aaron Simons(9)
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| | | | 605,793 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Stephen Cavoli
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| | | | 116,191 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Brett Fairclough(10)
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| | | | 53,403 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Cindy Lee(10)
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| | | | 36,397 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Joseph Molluso
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| | | | 330,128 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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William F. Cruger, Jr.(10)
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| | | | 74,164 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Virginia Gambale
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| | | | 16,910 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Joseph J. Grano, Jr.
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| | | | 33,814 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Joanne M. Minieri
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| | | | 41,385 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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John D. Nixon
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| | | | 29,590 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Christopher C. Quick
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| | | | 61,196 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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David J. Urban
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| | | | 45,039 | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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Barbara Finigan
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| | | | — | | | | | | * | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | | | | | * | | |
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All directors and executive officers as a group (15 persons)
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| | | | 71,958,420 | | | | | | 46.3% | | | | | | 60,091,740 | | | | | | 100.0% | | | | | | 87.9% | | |
Director and Chief Executive Officer
VIRTU FINANCIAL, INC.
the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware)
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By:
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Page
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ARTICLE 1 DEFINITIONS
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| | | | D-1 | | |
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ARTICLE 2 STOCKHOLDERS
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| | | | D-2 | | |
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ARTICLE 3 DIRECTORS
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| | | | D-8 | | |
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ARTICLE 4 COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD
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| | | | D-12 | | |
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ARTICLE 5 OFFICERS
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| | | | D-13 | | |
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ARTICLE 6 GENERAL PROVISIONS
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| | | | D-14 | | |
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Name
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Address
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| 1. Michael T. Viola | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 2. Aaron Simons | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 3. Vincent Viola | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 4. William F. Cruger Jr. | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 5. Barbara Finigan | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 6. Virginia Gambale | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 7. Joseph J. Grano | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 8. Joanne M. Minieri | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 9. John D. Nixon | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 10. Christopher C. Quick | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
| 11. David Urban | | | 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019 | |
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Page
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ARTICLE 1 DEFINITIONS
|
| | | | F-1 | | |
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ARTICLE 2 SHAREHOLDERS
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| | | | F-2 | | |
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ARTICLE 3 DIRECTORS
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| | | | F-8 | | |
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ARTICLE 4 COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD
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| | | | F-13 | | |
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ARTICLE 5 OFFICERS
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| | | | F-13 | | |
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ARTICLE 6 GENERAL PROVISIONS
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| | | | F-15 | | |
DEFINITIONS
SHAREHOLDERS
DIRECTORS
COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD
OFFICERS
GENERAL PROVISIONS