Here are the DEF 14A proxy statements from Kemper Corporation (KMPR) in our archive over the last 12 months, newest first, and each one links through to the document itself with the summary and the scores our analysis gives it.
A DEF 14A covers the proxy statement, with executive pay and the shareholder votes, so if you follow KMPR and want that one kind of document rather than the whole filing history, this is the page to keep. The company's other filings, of every form, are on the full KMPR filings page.
Kemper Corporation is asking shareholders to elect nine directors, approve an advisory Say-on-Pay vote for named executive officers, and ratify Deloitte & Touche LLP as auditor at the 2026 annual meeting on May 6. The board recommends voting FOR all three proposals and has set March 12, 2026 as the record date. All nine nominees are independent under NYSE and SEC rules, and the board is led by independent chairman Gerald Laderman, with all key committees chaired by independent directors.
The proxy details a 2025 CEO transition: long-time CEO Joseph P. Lacher Jr. departed in October 2025 and C. Thomas Evans Jr., previously General Counsel, became Interim CEO with an $800,000 base salary and a $1 million retention RSU grant. Kemper’s 2025 results reflected a difficult environment, with net income attributable to Kemper of $143.3 million versus $317.8 million in 2024 and adjusted consolidated net operating income of $225.5 million versus $381.5 million. Management emphasized actions in pricing, claims, expenses and geographic diversification, while maintaining holding company liquidity above $1.0 billion, trailing 12‑month operating cash flow of about $585 million, and book value per share rising to $45.71.
Executive pay remains heavily performance-based, combining salary, a short‑term cash incentive tied to adjusted operating income, distributable cash flow and individual goals, plus long‑term equity awards. For 2025, strong distributable cash flow contrasted with below‑target profitability, and STI bonuses for continuing NEOs were paid at substantially below‑target levels, generally around 77–83% of target, to reflect financial underperformance while recognizing leadership efforts during the transition.