Fed Minutes: Another Hike Likely, November CPI Too Late

By Stock Titan Editorial Team · Published October 7, 2026

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The minutes on a second hike: most, likely, by year end

The key sentence is short. In the section on the policy outlook, the minutes state that "most participants assessed that another increase in the target range for the federal funds rate would likely be appropriate by year end." The next sentence takes some of the certainty back, since participants "emphasized, however, that they approached each meeting with an open mind and decisions at future meetings would depend on incoming information and its implications for the outlook and the balance of risks."

Two remaining meetings fall inside that window, October 27-28 and December 8-9, according to the Fed’s meeting calendar. The minutes do not say which one, and they do not say what "likely" would require. The rest of the document is quite specific about what the committee is watching, even where the headline sentence is not, and that detail is where the answer sits.

A few facts frame the sentence. The September decision itself had no dissent: the statement passed 12-0, and the minutes record "Voting against this action: None." Before that, all participants, voters and non-voters alike, "supported raising the target range for the federal funds rate 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent." The decision, the vote and the press conference were covered in our September 16 article on the hike, so this piece stays with what the minutes add.

The word "participants" matters here. The FOMC has 12 voting members in 2026, but every Reserve Bank president takes part in the discussion, so the minutes describe the views of everyone at the table, including presidents who do not vote this year. A statement that "most participants" favor something is a statement about the whole group of up to 19 people, and it does not tell you how the 12 voters split.

Counting the support: 16 of 18 dots

The closest thing to a count is the dot plot in the September Summary of Economic Projections, where each participant marks the midpoint of the target range they see as appropriate at the end of each year. Eighteen participants submitted projections. For the end of 2026, 12 placed the midpoint at 4.125%, the equivalent of one more quarter-point hike from today’s 3.875% midpoint, and four placed it at 4.375%, the equivalent of two more. A year-end level does not say how many decisions it would take to get there or when. Two participants placed it at 3.875%, unchanged from today’s midpoint.

So 16 of the 18 people who filled in a dot projected at least one more increase, and that matches the minutes’ "most" without contradiction. It also shows how small the minority is. Nobody pencilled in a cut for 2026, and the two holdouts sit at the current rate, so the disagreement inside the committee is about one more hike or none, with a small group that would go further.

Show the data

Category	September 2026 projections	June 2026 projections
3.375%	0	1
3.625%	0	8
3.875%	2	3
4.125%	12	5
4.375%	4	1

In June the largest group, 8 of 18, sat at the then-current rate; by September only 2 of 18 did.

Three limits apply to that count. First, the dots are anonymous, so there is no way to tell from the published chart whether the two participants at 3.875% vote this year or not. Second, the Chair is missing from the count. Chairman Kevin Warsh said at his September 16 press conference that "as in June, I have not offered a projection of my own," and later called the projections "the forecasts of my 18 colleagues." Third, a dot is a projection of appropriate policy under each participant’s own forecast, submitted for the September meeting, and it is not a commitment to vote a certain way at a given meeting.

The change from June is the bigger story. In the June projections, made when the target range was 3.50% to 3.75%, eight participants placed the end-2026 midpoint at 3.625%, which was no change at the time, and one placed it at 3.375%, a cut. Three more sat at 3.875%, one hike above the rate at the time, so nine of 18 already had at least one 2026 hike pencilled in, and only six were at 4.125% or higher. By September that group had grown to 16, and the median end-2026 projection moved from 3.8% to 4.1%, according to Table 1 of the two summaries (the June release and the September one).

The projections for 2027 lean the same way. Eight participants projected an end-2027 midpoint of 4.375% and six projected 4.125%, putting 14 of 18 projections above today’s midpoint at that year-end; four were below it, and the median was 4.1%. Year-end endpoints do not reveal the path in between, so they cannot tell you whether a participant expects to hold a rate, raise it further or cut it within the year.

The anonymity of the dots still leaves room for a lower bound on the voters. Of the 18 participants who submitted projections, 11 are voters (the 12 voters minus the Chair) and seven are presidents who do not vote this year. Even if all seven non-voters were among the 16 who projected a higher year-end rate, at least nine of the 11 voting submitters would be too. That counts projections made in September, and votes at a future meeting could differ. It does suggest the "most participants" in the minutes is not carried by the non-voters.

Two different reasons to hike again

The minutes give two separate reasons for a higher path. "Many participants emphasized that a higher path for the target range would be prudent on risk-management grounds, providing insurance against inflation remaining persistently above target due to stronger-than-expected demand or further adverse supply shocks." Separately, "a number of participants viewed a higher path for the target range as necessary based on their modal outlooks rather than on risk-management grounds."

The two reasons could respond differently to the data. An official who wants insurance is hedging against a bad outcome, so softer data could lower the value of that insurance without moving their central forecast very much at all. An official whose most likely forecast already calls for higher rates would need to see that forecast change before backing away, and that usually takes more than one report. The minutes describe the first view with "many" and the second with "a number," but they do not say whether the two groups overlap, how they map onto the dots, or how either group feels about a second hike in particular, so the size of each camp cannot be read from the text.

Other passages explain why the bar for a further move looks low to some officials. "Several participants stated that they viewed the current policy rate as not restrictive or only mildly restrictive." A couple of participants said they had raised their estimate of the neutral federal funds rate, the rate that neither speeds up nor slows down the economy, and with it their view of where the target range should sit. If policy is not yet restraining demand, a quarter point more is a smaller step for those officials than it would look from outside. Warsh made a related point about financial conditions at the press conference, saying he "would be hard pressed to describe broad financial conditions as restrictive" and that this view "was widely shared by the Committee."

Some participants added an argument about expectations, saying a higher rate "would diminish the risk of persistently elevated inflation unanchoring inflation expectations and becoming further entrenched." A couple of participants wanted to keep price increases coming from energy and from AI-related demand "from broadening out" into the rest of the economy.

Against all of that, the minutes record views that point the other way, mostly about labor costs. Some participants "commented that aggregate wage growth was moderate and consistent with inflation moving toward 2 percent, or that the labor market was not currently a source of inflationary pressures." The minutes do not tie any of these views to a particular dot, so the published documents cannot tell you whether the same people sit at 3.875%.

If you would like the background on how a change in the target range feeds into loan, deposit and bond rates, our guide to Federal Reserve interest rates covers it.

Three meetings of rising support for a hike

Read in sequence, the last three sets of minutes show support for higher rates spreading through the committee in three months. In the June minutes, all participants backed holding the range at 3.50% to 3.75%, and only "a few participants commented that, in light of these developments, there was a case for raising the target range." On the year-end outlook, the minutes described two groups: "many participants" saw the right rate "within or slightly below the current target range," while "many other participants" saw it above.

By July the balance had moved. The July minutes say "most participants supported maintaining the current target range," but "several participants favored an increase of 25 basis points." Three of them were voters, and the July statement records that Beth M. Hammack, Neel Kashkari and Lorie K. Logan "preferred to raise the target range." The same minutes added a conditional that turned out to matter: "Many participants assessed that policy tightening would likely be necessary if inflation did not decline."

Show the data

Date	Event
Jun 17	Hold, 12-0; a few saw a case for a hike
Jul 29	Hold, 9-3; three voters wanted a hike
Sep 16	Hike, 12-0; all participants backed it
Oct 7	Minutes: most see another hike by year end

Support for the September hike itself and support for another one are separate things, and the timeline tracks both.

September is where that conditional was tested. The minutes say participants "had not seen sufficient progress on lowering inflation in recent months," and every participant backed the hike. The forward-looking sentence then moved from "many" and a conditional to "most" and "would likely be appropriate by year end." Our coverage of the June decision described the first tilt in the dots toward a hike; the September minutes show how far that tilt has travelled since.

The inflation tests the minutes set

Nowhere do the minutes list a threshold that would trigger a second hike. What they do name is the set of inflation measures participants were reading, and each of those is something you could check yourself as new data comes out. Warsh put the overall standard this way at the press conference: "We must be confident that underlying inflation is moving to our objective, clearly and at sufficient speed."

Underlying inflation comes first. "Some participants noted that, according to various modeling approaches, underlying inflation appeared to be above the Committee’s 2 percent objective and to have moved sideways in recent months." That is a judgment about trend, and it lines up with Warsh’s remark that "too many categories are still posting increases above 3 percent on both a 6- and 12-month basis."

Two parts of the price index got singled out. "Several participants observed that the rate of price increases in core services excluding housing remained elevated," and several said core goods inflation "also remained elevated, as effects of the AI buildout appeared to increase while the effects of tariff increases waned." Both categories have come up in more than one set of minutes this year.

A methodological point came up that matters for reading the next releases. A few participants noted that some items in the PCE price index, software and portfolio management fees in particular, had made relatively large contributions to recent readings, "and that those contributions would likely be reduced somewhat with the upcoming changes to the BEA’s methodology." The Fed staff estimated that August PCE inflation would be 3.8% overall and 3.4% for core under the old method, and 3.6% and 3.2% under the new one.

The minutes also flag a measure to be careful with. "A few participants observed that the 3-month change measure of core PCE inflation showed a material decline since the start of the year but cautioned that this measure is more volatile than the 12-month change measure and has shown a strong tendency to understate inflation in the second half of the year compared with the first half." So the measure most likely to look reassuring this autumn is one that a few officials have already cautioned about.

Show the data

Category	12-month change	3-month annualized
Jan	2.9%	3.5%
Feb	3.0%	4.3%
Mar	3.1%	4.0%
Apr	3.1%	3.6%
May	3.2%	3.4%
Jun	3.0%	2.9%
Jul	3.0%	2.3%
Aug	3.0%	2.0%

One year of that gap does not prove the seasonal point the officials made.

The last group covers expectations and business costs. "Several participants noted that market- and survey-based measures of short-term inflation expectations were elevated," though longer-term measures stayed consistent with 2%. "Many participants cited their business contacts and business surveys as reporting increased cost pressures," and some said businesses "appeared to have been more successful in passing cost increases through to consumers." Then there is the sentence on energy, which we would call the clearest condition in the whole document: "Many participants assessed that the longer energy prices remained elevated, the greater the risk that cost increases in certain sectors could lead to broader price pressures."

Three weeks of data since the meeting

About three weeks of data have come out since the committee met, and the readings do not all point the same way. In the table we set each condition from the minutes next to the latest reading from the agency that publishes it.

The inflation side came in lower than the Fed staff had estimated. The Bureau of Economic Analysis August release showed the PCE price index up 0.3% on the month and 3.4% from a year earlier, with core up 0.2% and 3.0%. That release carried BEA’s annual update of the national accounts, which revised the data back to January 2021, so the figures are on a different footing from the ones the committee had in front of it. Both came in two tenths below the staff’s new-method estimate in the minutes. Spending was strong in the same release, with real consumer spending up 0.6% in August, which matters because the minutes treat demand as one of the risks.

The labor side came in softer. The September jobs report showed payrolls up 29,000 and the unemployment rate at 4.2%, against 4.1% in July and August. Revisions cut July from +21,000 to -10,000 and August from +162,000 to +133,000, so "employment in July and August combined is 60,000 lower than previously reported," in the words of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Average hourly earnings rose 3.0% over 12 months. The minutes had said that "the pace of nonfarm payroll employment gains picked up notably in August" and that a majority of participants saw the labor market as having "strengthened a bit," so the revised picture is weaker than the one the committee discussed.

Show the data

Category	Value
Jan	160K
Feb	-156K
Mar	214K
Apr	148K
May	63K
Jun	31K
Jul	-10K
Aug	133K
Sep	29K

The September figure and both revisions were published on October 2, after the meeting.

None of that, on its own, contradicts the case most officials made. The BLS still describes unemployment as moving in "a narrow range of 4.1 percent to 4.3 percent since March," and the minutes judged risks to the labor market "broadly balanced," so a modest softening is consistent with how the committee described the risks. Revised payroll growth of about 51,000 a month from July to September also compares with an average of 45,000 over the prior 12 months, according to the BLS, which is a less dramatic slowdown than the comparison with the first August estimate suggests. The softer data does fit the view some participants had already voiced, that the labor market was not a source of inflation pressure.

Energy points the other way. The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s weekly gasoline price series put regular gasoline at $4.354 a gallon on October 5, down from $4.478 on September 21 but $1.230 higher than the $3.124 of October 6, 2025. That is the duration test the minutes set, and so far prices have stayed high for longer, not shorter.

Consumer prices for September arrive on October 14. August CPI rose 0.4% on the month and 3.4% from a year earlier, with core CPI at 2.4%. Core PCE, which a few participants said had been lifted by software and portfolio management fees before BEA’s method change, still runs above that at 3.0%. None of the releases cited here measures core services excluding housing in PCE terms, or short-term inflation expectations, so two of the tests the minutes named are still open, and the September CPI report will be the next look at both goods and services prices.

Officials’ remarks since September 16

Speeches since the meeting put names on part of the "most participants" group, and they also show that agreeing on a second hike is not the same as agreeing on its timing. The table covers officials who addressed the policy path in text published on the Board’s or a Reserve Bank’s own site between September 17 and October 7; other texts in the window, such as Chicago’s Austan Goolsbee on September 21, discussed inflation risks without a view on another hike. All of them came before the October 2 jobs report. Five of the seven also came before the September 30 PCE release; Logan and Jefferson spoke on October 1, after it, and Jefferson cited the new 3.4% figure for August.

Four of the 12 voters have said in published text that more tightening is likely or may be needed, and Logan, who dissented for a hike in July, wants at least two more quarter points. In her October 1 remarks she also noted that "higher term premiums can slow the economy, reducing the need to tighten monetary policy," which ties the size of the next steps to the bond market.

Barr’s argument in Detroit on September 29 rests on the inflation trend: "I count only two months of data consistent with 2 percent core PCE inflation over the past 20 months." Paulson, in her September 24 speech, framed it as conditional on conditions evolving as she expects.

Williams, whose New York Fed seat makes him the committee’s vice chair, said the most about timing. In his September 29 speech he said one further increase "may be appropriate late this year" if the economy follows his forecast, and that "there is no need for urgency, and we have time to gather more information." He did not name a meeting, and both remaining meetings fall in the last ten weeks of the year.

Vice Chair Jefferson stayed on the fence in a speech on October 1. He supported the September hike and said "any future adjustments in policy should be determined by carefully examining trends in the data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks." He pointed to the bond market, "Since our September meeting, yields across the term structure have increased further," and added that "my colleagues and I will need to come to our own judgment, which may take more time." Governor Cook, in remarks on September 28, said the "number and magnitude of any future adjustments" would be informed by how the economy reacts to the policy actions so far and by the inflation and labor data over the coming months.

We found no policy text in that window from the Chair, Powell, Bowman, Waller, Hammack or Kashkari on the Board’s or their Reserve Bank’s sites. Hammack and Kashkari both dissented for a hike in July, so the absence of text from them says nothing about a change of view.

The bond market’s move and the committee’s view of it

The 10-year Treasury yield has risen sharply since the meeting began. The 10-year constant maturity yield was 5.00% on September 15, the day the meeting began, and 5.31% on October 5, according to Federal Reserve H.15 data in StockTitan’s macro database (FRED series DGS10). In that series, 5.31% is the highest daily reading since May 14, 2002, when it was 5.32%; the highest value between 2003 and 2025 was 5.26%, on June 12, 2007. The Treasury’s own daily par yield curve shows the 10-year at 5.27% on October 6.

The composition of the move is the useful part. The 10-year inflation-protected yield, a measure of real borrowing costs (FRED series DFII10), rose from 2.62% to 2.95% over the same dates, so the gap between the two, a rough gauge of the inflation compensation investors demand, barely moved, from 2.38 to 2.36 percentage points by our calculation. The rise came through real yields, while ten-year inflation compensation was flat over those dates.

Show the data

Category	10-year nominal	10-year TIPS real
Sep 1	4.79%	2.44%
Sep 8	4.80%	2.43%
Sep 15	5.00%	2.62%
Sep 22	4.96%	2.63%
Sep 29	5.26%	2.91%
Oct 5	5.31%	2.95%

The two lines rise by almost the same amount, which is why the inflation gap between them hardly changed.

The minutes had already touched on this debate. In the staff review, "changes in real rates contributed to most of the net increase in longer-maturity Treasury yields" over the intermeeting period. A few participants talked about the reasons, citing stronger data, "increased expectations for AI-related borrowing, and geopolitical developments," and "many participants commented that, despite the recent rise in longer-term Treasury yields, financial conditions appeared to be supportive of economic growth."

Logan’s speech shows why that reading is not simple, since she said shifts in market risk-free rates "reveal what market participants think the Fed will need to do," while higher term premiums, the extra yield investors demand for holding long bonds, "can slow the economy, reducing the need to tighten."

The rise in real yields we measured does not separate those two pieces, and any split between them depends on models. If officials conclude that term premiums drove the move, some of the insurance argument fades. If they read it as markets pricing a higher policy path on stronger growth, it fits the view that policy is still not restrictive. For the rise before the meeting, Warsh cited economic strength, competition for capital and geopolitics at the press conference, and the manager’s market briefing in the minutes reported commentary tying the last two to higher term premiums.

Mortgage borrowers already feel the move, as Freddie Mac’s weekly survey had the 30-year fixed rate at 7.28% on October 1 (FRED series MORTGAGE30US), and a few participants said housing was a sector where financial conditions "did not appear supportive of activity."

The data calendar before October 28 and December 9

The timing of the major releases makes the two meetings very different decisions. Among the reports tracked here, the committee gets two new inflation readings before the October 28 announcement, September CPI on October 14 and September producer prices on October 15, according to the BLS CPI schedule and PPI schedule. September PCE prices come the day after the decision, on October 29, according to the BEA release schedule, and the next jobs report is November 6, according to the BLS employment schedule. Fed staff also estimate PCE inflation from the CPI and PPI before BEA publishes it, as the minutes show for August, so a missing PCE release is not the same as missing information.

Show the data

Date	Event
Oct 14	September CPI
Oct 15	September PPI
Oct 28	FOMC decision
Oct 29	September PCE prices
Nov 6	October jobs report
Nov 10	October CPI
Nov 13	October PPI
Nov 25	October PCE prices
Dec 4	November jobs report
Dec 9	FOMC decision
Dec 10	November CPI

Two dates fall the day after a decision.

The December meeting gets a lot more to look at. There are two jobs reports (October data on November 6 and November data on December 4), October CPI on November 10, October producer prices on November 13, and two PCE reports (September data on October 29 and October data on November 25), all before the December 9 decision. November CPI is scheduled for December 10, the day after the decision.

Officials who want to see "trends in the data," in Jefferson’s words, get most of the trend after October. Warsh said he is "not a data-point-dependent guy" and that "data points are noisy," which suggests the Chair, at least, will not treat any single release as decisive. The December meeting is also the next one with a Summary of Economic Projections, which makes it the meeting where a shift in the dots would be published.

Developments that could strengthen or weaken the case

This part is our interpretation of the minutes. The minutes do not set any threshold for a second hike, so what we list here are directions you could watch for in the data, each one tied back to something the minutes said.

Toward a hike, we would look for core services outside housing and core goods staying high in the September and October CPI and PCE reports, for gasoline and other energy prices holding near where they are now (that is the "longer energy prices remained elevated" worry in the minutes), for short-term inflation expectations moving up again and for more officials saying in public that policy is not restrictive. A rebound in payrolls toward the August pace as first reported would also help the majority’s case.

Away from a hike, the signs would be a broad and sustained slowdown in the 12-month inflation rates, not only in the 3-month measure a few officials cautioned about; a clearer weakening in the labor market than the September report showed; officials treating the rise in long-term yields as tightening that does part of the committee’s work; and an easing of the demand and supply risks the insurance argument rests on, of which energy prices are one.

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